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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of federal income taxation is replete with amendments en-
acted to facilitate and, in some cases, encourage adjustments in the form
of doing business.1 One of the earliest problems discovered in the taxing
statutes was the treatment, as a taxable transaction, of a transfer of ap-
preciated or depreciated property to a corporation in exchange for all of
its capital stock.' In order to rectify this unfortunate result, Congress en-
acted the predecessor of section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
as part of the Revenue Act of 1921.' The legislative history of that pro-
vision indicates that Congress intended that the transfer of property to a
controlled corporation be viewed as a mere change in form of ownership,
having no adverse federal income tax consequences to the transferor or
the transferee."
If applied properly, section 3 5 I provides insulation from federal income
' Review, for example, the legislative history of the predecessor of § 332 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, relating to liquidation of corporate subsidiaries. 80 CONG. REC. 9038, 10288,
10452 (1936). This section was enacted to encourage elimination of unnecessary holding company
structures.
"Jefferson Livingston, 18 B.T.A. 1184 (1930), acquiesced in, IX-2 CuM. BULL. 36 (1930).
3Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202 (c) (3), 42 Stat. 227. With only relatively insignificant
changes in language, a similar provision was included in each subsequent revenue statute. In the
Revenue Act of 1928, the pertinent provision was ch. 852, § 112(b)(5), 45 Stat. 791. The In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 re-enacted § 112(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 as
§ 351. For clarity, all references in this Article will be to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351, al-
though many judicial decisions discussed herein were decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
112(b) (5).
4S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 CUM. BULL. (pt. 2)
181, 188-89.
' INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351 provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred
to a corporation (including, in the case of transfers made on or before June 30, 1967,
an investment company) by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or per-
sons are in control (as defined in section 368 (c)) of the corporation. For purposes of
this section, stock or securities issued for services shall not be considered as issued
in return for property.
(b) RECEIPT OF PROPETY.-If subsection (a) would apply to an exchange but for
the fact that there is received, in addition to the stock or securities permitted to be
received under subsection (a), other property or money, then-
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but not in excess of-
(A) the amount of money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property received; and
(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) SPECIAL RULE.-In determining control, for purposes of this section, the fact
that any corporate transferor distributes part or all of the stock which it receives
in the exchange to its shareholders shall not be taken into account.
(d) APPLICATION OF JUNE 30, 1967, DATE.-For purposes of this section, if, in
connection with the transaction, a registration statement is required to be filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, a transfer of property to an investment
company shall be treated as made on or before June 30, 1967, only if-
(1) such transfer is made on or before such date,
(2) the registration statement was filed with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission before January 1, 1967, and the aggregate issue price of the stock
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taxation upon the incorporation of a proprietorship, partnership, or new
business. In addition, it permits the transfer of property to an existing
corporation if the transferor or transferors control the corporation im-
mediately after the transfer.' As with all federal income tax statutes, the
requirements of section 351 must be carefully observed in order to achieve
the desired result. Frequently, a section 351 incorporation is viewed as a
"routine" transaction from a federal income tax standpoint. Many tax-
payers have learned to their financial detriment that such is not always the
case. Because of the number of conditions which must be met and the prob-
lems which must be resolved, the Internal Revenue Service recently is-
sued Revenue Procedure 70-177 to provide guidance for taxpayers request-
ing advance rulings on section 351 transactions. The Service has taken such
action only with respect to a few sections of the Internal Revenue Code,
and such action in itself should warn the tax practitioner that section 351
transactions must be planned with a great deal of care.
It is the purpose of this Article to review the conditions of the statute
and the numerous problems which may arise in the planning and consum-
mation of a tax-free incorporation, with emphasis on those problems fre-
quently overlooked in what appear to be "routine" section 351 trans-
actions.
II. THE BASIC STATUTORY SCHEME
Under the general rule of section 351 (a), no gain or loss is recognized
if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely
in exchange for stock or securities of the transferee corporation and im-
mediately after the exchange the transferor or transferors are in control
of the transferee corporation! For purposes of section 351 (a), stock or
and securities of the investment company which are issued in the transaction
does not exceed the aggregate amount therefor specified in the registration
statement as of the close of December 31, 1966, and
(3) the transfer of property to the investment company in the transaction
includes only property deposited before May 1, 1967.
(e) CRoss REFERENCES.-
(1) For special rule where another party to the exchange assumes a liability,
or acquires property subject to a liability, see section 357.
(2) For the basis of stock, securities, or property received in an exchange to
which this section applies, see sections 358 and 362.
(3) For special rule in the case of an exchange described in this section but
which results in a gift, see section 2501 and following.
(4) For special rule in the case of an exchange described in this section but
which has the effect of the payment of compensation by the corporation
or by a transferor, see section 61 (a) (1).
The only changes to § 112(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which became 5 351
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, were (1) elimination of the substantially proportionate
test as discussed in the text accompanying notes 79-87 infra; (2) addition of the provision that,
in determining control, no consideration is given to the fact that a corporate transferor distributes
stock or securities received in the exchange to its shareholders as discussed in the text accompanying
notes 140, 141 infra; and (3) addition of the provision that stock or securities issued for services
shall not be considered as issued in return for property as discussed in the text accompanying
notes 39-48 intra. Section 351 was amended in 1966 to exclude transfers to investment companies
made after June 30, 1967, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 331-39 infra.
'See Treas. Reg. S 1.351-1(a)(2), example (3) (1967).
7 Rev. Proc. 70-17, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 40.
8 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(c), defines control as ownership of at least 80% of the out-
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securities issued for services are not considered as issued in exchange for
property.!
The transferee corporation is insulated from taxation by section 1032 (a),
which provides that a corporation recognizes no gain or loss upon the is-
suance of its stock in exchange for money or other property." If stock is
issued for services, the corporation should be entitled to a deduction under
section 162 (a) in an amount equal to the fair market value of the stock."
In the alternative, if the services relate to the organization of the corpora-
tion, the value should be capitalized and amortized under section 248.'2
The transferor receiving solely stock or securities for property substi-
tutes the basis of the property transferred as the basis of the stock or se-
curities received."s The transferee corporation takes as its basis the trans-
feror's basis in such property. 4 The carryover-basis provisions are consis-
tent with the legislative intent of section 351 that a transfer of property
to a controlled corporation in exchange for stock or securities be treated as
a mere change in the form of ownership.
If a transferor receives "boot" in the form of money or other property
in addition to stock or securities of the transferee corporation, gain is
recognized by such transferor, but not in excess of the amount of money
plus the fair market value of other property received."5 The receipt of
boot, however, does not permit recognition of loss by the transferor.'" If
a transferor recognizes gain because of the receipt of boot, such trans-
feror's basis in the stock or securities received is decreased by the fair market
value of the boot received and is increased by the amount of gain recog-
nized." The transferor acquires basis in the boot equal to its fair market
value."
By virtue of the general rule of section 357 (a), the assumption of lia-
bilities by the transferee corporation or the receipt of property subject to
a liability does not constitute payment of boot to the transferor. The trans-
feror's basis in the stock or securities received is reduced by the amount of
liabilities assumed (or to which the transferred property is subject).' As
discussed below, the assumption of debt or receipt of property subject to
debt may be treated as boot to the transferor if (1) the liability is assumed
for tax avoidance purposes or there is no business purpose for the as-
standing voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total number
of shares of all other classes of outstanding stock.
'Id. § 351 (a) (last sentence).
"See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(a) (1956).
" Rev. Rul. 62-217, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 59. The corporation would recognize no gain or loss
by issuing stock to pay such obligation by virtue of § 1032(a). For a case reaching this result
under S 1032(a), see Commissioner v. Fender Sales, Inc., 338 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1964).
12Cf. H1ollywood Baseball Ass'n, 42 T.C. 234, 270-71 '(1964), acquiesced in 'ao this issue,
964-2 CuM. BULL. 6.
1lNT. Ray. CoDE of 1954, 358(a).
1
4





"Id. § 358 (a) (1).
'aId. 358(a)(2).
"91d. 55 358(a)(1)(A)(ii), 358(d).
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sumption, ° or (2) the amount of liabilities transferred exceeds the trans-
feror's total basis in the properties transferred."'
The precise meaning of the terms used in any statute must be thoroughly
analyzed to assure that the desired result can be achieved. If a tax-free
incorporation is to be accomplished under section 3 51, the statutory terms




The first important term which must be considered in section 351 (a) is
"property." Property is not defined within section 351, nor is there any
cross-reference to another section for a definition of the term."* The
absence of a definition of property has created few problems except with
regard to certain intangibles where services of the transferor were in-
volved in the creation of those intangibles.
Both the IRS and the courts have recognized that the term "property,"
as used in section 351, includes money.2' From the transferor's point of
view, little significance attaches to this treatment since no gain or loss
would result from the purchase of stock or securities for cash even if sec-
tion 351 did not apply to the transaction. Such treatment, however, does
assume significance when one transferor purchases stock for cash and an-
other transferor acquires stock by the transfer of appreciated or depreciated
properties. For example, assume that one transferor purchases fifty per
cent of the common stock of a corporation for cash and that the second
transferor acquires the remaining fifty per cent by transferring property
to the corporation having a basis of $5,000 and a fair market value of
$100,000. Failure to treat cash as property would make the transaction
taxable to the second transferor, and he would recognize gain on the ex-
change in the amount of $95,000.
Little doubt exists that normal business assets, such as accounts receiv-
able,' installment notes,25 inventory," patents,' stock or securities of an-
1id. § 357(b) (1).
"Id. § 357(c).
2'The definition of "property" found in § 317(a) applies only to part I of subchapter C,
which does not include § 351.
"3Rev. Rul. 69-357, 1969-1 Ctm. BULL. 101; Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d
479, 488-89 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); George M. Holstein, III, 23 T.C.
923, 924-25 (1955).
"Cf. P.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940); Arthur L. Kniffen,
39 T.C. 553 (1962), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 5; Thomas W. Briggs, 15 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 440, 451 (1956). Accounts -and notes receivable are, by inference, defined as "property"
(although not as a capital asset) in § 1221. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221(4).
S'.The transfer of an installment obligation under § 351 presumably is not a "disposition" by
the transferor which would trigger previously unrecognized gain. -Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c)(2)
(1958); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940). Butsee Jack Ammann Photogrammetric Eng'rs, Inc. v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 466 (Sth
Cir. 1965), discussed in text accompanying note 285 infra, which implies a contrary result in
certain situations.
' Like accounts and notes receivable, inventory is, by inference, defined as "property" (al-
though not as a capital asset) in § 1221. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1221 (1).
"TClaude Neon Lights, Inc., 35 B.T.A. 424, 427-28 (1937).
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
other corporation,"8 and intangibles," constitute property for purposes of
section 351. Beneficial or equitable interests in property are also treated as
property under section 351.30 Hence, in most cases, the transfer of creditors'
claims qualifies as a transfer of property under section 3 5 ."
Two recent Tax Court decisions have dealt directly with the meaning
of the term "property" under section 3 5 1, and have delineated, to some
extent, its scope. In H. B. Zachry Co." the taxpayer entered into an agree-
ment with a corporation to exchange a "carved-out" oil payment in the
amount of $650,000 for all of the authorized common stock of the new
corporation. The taxpayer contended that its transfer of a carved-out oil
payment in exchange for the common stock was a section 351 transfer,
and that no gain or loss should be recognized. The Commissioner argued
that the oil payment did not constitute property within the meaning of
section 351 (a), and that the transfer of such oil payment for stock was
a taxable exchange." The Commissioner argued that because of the Su-
preme Court's decision in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.,- the carved-
out oil payment was merely an income right and therefore did not con-
stitute property for purposes of section 351. The Tax Court, relying upon
the Supreme Court's observation in the Lake case, that oil payments are
interests in land, held that the oil payment was property.' By way of foot-
note, the court stated:
[Section] 351 does not contain a definition of the term 'property.' However,
the known inclusions and exclusions strongly suggest that the term encom-
passes whatever may be transferred. Significantly, 'services' are explicitly
excepted by [section] 351(a). Such a singular and extraordinary exception
denotes the scope of the term 'property' under the rule of statutory construc-
tion-exressio unius est exclusio alterius."
It appears from the rather broad language of the Tax Court in Zachry
that anything which may be transferred to a corporation will be treated
as property for purposes of section 351 regardless of its character, pro-
S G.C.M. 7285, IX-1 CUM. BULL. 181 (1930). A transfer of notes of the transferee cor-
poration to such corporation for additional stock of such corporation also qualifies as an exchange
for property to which § 351 applies. Rev. Rul. 57-296, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 234.
29Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 133; cf, Rev. Rul. 65-180, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 279,
and Rev. Rul. 64-235, 1964-2 Cum. BUeLL. 18, relating to treatment of goodwill as property.
"oRoberts Co., 5 T.C. I (1945), acquiesced in, 1945 CuM. BULL. 6.
"Helvering v. Cement Investors, Inc., 316 U.S. 527 (1942); Seiberling Rubber Co. v. Com-
missioner, 169 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1948); Rev. Rul. 57-296, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 234. But see
United States v. Santa Inez Co., 145 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 879 (1945),
and Civic Center Fin. Co. v. Kuhl, 83 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Wis. 1948), aff'd per curiam, 177
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1949), in which the property transfer and the acquisition of stock were
treated as separate transactions. See Note, Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code and "Mid-
Stream Incorporations," 38 CrNi-. L. REv. 96, 101-02 (1969).
a 4 9 T.C. 73 (1967).53Under § 636(a), enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, carved-out oil payments,
with limited exceptions, will be treated as loans, and the question should be moot.
4356 U.S. 260 (1958).
'The Tax Court did not decide who would be taxable on the subsequent income from the
carved-out oil payment. Presumably, even though the transfer qualified under § 351, the trans-
feror would be taxable on the subsequent income. Cf. Eugene T. Flewellen, 32 T.C. 317 (1959),
in which the taxpayer was allowed a charitable contribution deduction upon assignment of a carved-
out oil payment to "charity," but was taxable on subsequent income.
349 T.C. 73, 80 n.6 (1967).
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vided services of the transferor were not involved in the creation of the item
transferred. If services have been rendered by the transferor in the creation
of the item transferred, the IRS and the courts will continue to examine
the transaction carefully to see that the stock is not being issued for ser-
vices. This approach was taken by the Tax Court in the recent case of
William A. James.' There, the taxpayer entered into an agreement with
two other parties whereby the taxpayer was to promote and construct an
apartment house. The agreement provided that upon completion of the
project, the parties would form a corporation to hold the apartment house.
Voting stock of such corporation was to be distributed one-half to the
taxpayer and one-half to the two other parties, and nonvoting stock was
to be issued to equalize the equities of the parties. The agreement was exe-
cuted in January 1963, and immediately thereafter the taxpayer began
negotiations to fulfill his obligations under the contract. In August 1963,
the taxpayer obtained mortgage commitments. In November 1963, the
corporation was formed with the taxpayer transferring the mortgage com-
mitments and certain other contracts to the corporation in exchange for
stock, and the two other parties transferring land to the corporation in
exchange for stock. The Commissioner alleged that the stock issued to the
taxpayer had been issued for services, not property. The taxpayer argued
that he received such stock in consideration for his transfer of the mortgage
commitments to the corporation, and that such commitments constituted
property within the meaning of section 351. The taxpayer contended that
as a result of the services performed by him, he acquired property in the
form of certain contract rights which he transferred to the corporation.
The Tax Court found that the taxpayer did not transfer any property to
the corporation, but merely performed services on its behalf pursuant to
the January 1963 agreement. 8
It appears that the Tax Court in James placed strong reliance on the fact
that the services were rendered as part of an overall plan to form a corpo-
ration to own the apartment house. A different decision might have re-
sulted had the taxpayer obtained the mortgage commitments for his own
benefit and subsequently decided to transfer such rights to a newly formed
corporation. In such a situation, it would indeed be difficult to hold that
such services were rendered for the corporation when, at the time the ser-
vices were rendered, the taxpayer had no plan or obligation to transfer
such rights to a corporation. Nevertheless, the Tax Court's decision in
James illustrates well the problem which may occur under section 351 if
services of the transferor have been involved in the creation of an item
transferred to a corporation.
47 53 T.C. 63 (1969).
" See also Elihu B. Washburne, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1968), in which the taxpayer
argued unsuccessfully that he received stock in a new corporation in exchange for an option to
acquire 10% of the stock of such company. The Tax Court found, without deciding whether
an oral option constituted "property" for purposes of § 3 51, that the stock was issued either for
the taxpayer's bringing the availability of a business to the attention of the new corporation or
for the taxpayer's agreement to continue as an employee of the new corporation. The Tax Court
concluded that since such reasons were the consideration for the issuance of the stock, such stock
was issued for services rendered or to be rendered for the new corporation.
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In order to fully analyze the problems which may arise relating to stock
or securities issued for services or for property resulting from personal
services, three separate factual problems must be considered:
1. Stock or securities issued for services rendered or to be rendered
to the transferee corporation;
2. Stock or securities issued for services rendered to a third party;
and
3. Stock or securities issued for property created by personal services.
B. Services to the Transferee Corporation
As indicated above,"9 stock or securities received for services are not con-
sidered as having been issued for property under section 351. The legisla-
tive history of section 351 indicates that only stock or securities issued as
compensation to a person who has rendered or will render services to the
transferee corporations will not be treated as issued for property.' The
regulations treat stock or securities issued for services "rendered or to be
rendered to or for the benefit of the issuing corporation" as not being is-
sued for property." The James case is an excellent example of the disquali-
fication of a section 3 51 transaction because of the issuance of stock for
services in such a situation.'
The fact that stock or securities are issued for services by the trans-
feree corporation does not necessarily prevent application of section 3 51
for the benefit of those parties transferring property to the corporation."
The person or persons receiving stock or securities in exchange for services
are not included in determining whether the transferors are in control of
the transferee immediately after the exchange as required by section 3 51.
If the persons who transfer property control the corporation immediately
after the exchange, section 3 51 applies to those transferors regardless of the
fact that one or more persons may have received stock for services in the
same transaction." For example, assume that A and B transfer property to
X corporation in return for eighty-two per cent of its stock, and C agrees
to render services in the future for X corporation in exchange for eighteen
per cent of its stock. Even though C received stock for services, the trans-
ferors of property (A and B) control the corporation immediately after
the exchange, and section 3 51 applies to their transfers. The fair market
value of the stock received by C would be taxable to C as compensation.'
If, however, A and B had received less than eighty per cent of the stock
39 See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
40H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1954). See also Rev. Proc. 70-17, 1970 TNT.
REv. BULL. No. 27, at 40, § 3.04(1) (b).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.351-I(a)(1)(i) (195). It is clear that the language of the Regulations
is broad enough to encompass services rendered "for the benefit of" a corporation to be formed.
See, :eg., William A. James, 53 T.C. 63 (1969), -discussed in the text accompanying note 37
suspra; and Elihu B. Washburne, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1968), discussed in note 38 supra.
" See text accompanying note 37 supra.4 3 See H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1954), which indicates that application of
the last sentence of § 351(a), relating to stock or securities issued for services, is not intended to
vitiate the remaining portion of the transaction if § 351(a) otherwise would apply.




and C had received more than twenty per cent of the stock solely for
services, section 351 would not apply with respect to A and B.
If a person transfers property in exchange for stock or securities and
also receives stock or securities for services, the entire amount of stock
received by such transferor is counted in determining whether the trans-
ferors of property have control of the corporation," unless the transfer
of property by such transferor is merely a device to allow section 351 to
apply to those parties actually transferring property."7 For example, if A
and B receive seventy-five per cent of the stock of X corporation for prop-
erty, and C receives twenty-five per cent of the stock for services and
property having substantial value, the transfer qualifies under section 351
even though C would recognize compensation income equal to the fair
market value of the stock received for services.
If the corporation issues stock or securities for services, it should be en-
titled to a deduction under section 162(a), or to an organizational ex-
pense amortizable under section 248, in an amount equal to the fair market
value of the stock issued. By virtue of section 1032 (a), the corporation
would realize no gain or loss on the issuance of its stock or securities for
services."
C. Services Performed for Third Parties
The courts have indicated that stock or securities issued for cash-basis
accounts receivable created by sales or services to customers of a prede-
cessor entity are issued for property within the meaning of section 351.0
Such a conclusion with respect to cash-basis accounts receivable not only
postpones the time for taxation of such income to the transferor, but also
converts such income from ordinary into capital gain income, assuming
the stock is a capital asset to the transferor ° and that the corporation is
not collapsible."
A much more difficult question arises when stock is issued to a cash-
basis taxpayer for a claim resulting from services rendered to the prede-
cessor entity or the owners of such entity. Again, if the stock or securities
issued for such a claim are deemed to have been issued for property, not
only will taxation of the income be postponed, but the income will also
be converted from ordinary into capital gain income, assuming the capital
asset test is met and collapsibility can be avoided." The regulations under
section 351 deal specifically with the treatment of stock or securities is-
sued by a corporation for services rendered to the predecessor entity or its
'Id. S 1.351-1(a)(2), example (3).4Tid. § 1311a ()i)
48 See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
"oP.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940); Arthur L. Kniffen, 39
T.C. 553, 565-66 (1962), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 5; Thomas W. Briggs, 15 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 440 (1956). See also Rev. Proc. 70-17, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 40, S
3.02(3) (b)(i). There is no question that accrual basis accounts receivable should be treated as
property, since the transferor has previously reported the income with respect to such receivables
and merely has a money claim which should be a property right.
" See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1221.
51 See id. § 341.
"'See id. §§ 341, 1221.
1970]
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owners." The regulations provide that such a transaction, in most instances,
will be treated as though all the stock had been issued first to the owner
or owners of the predecessor entity in exchange for the assets of that busi-
ness, with part of the stock or securities being immediately transferred to
the employee for prior services." For example, assume that a proprietor
decides to incorporate his business and have ten per cent of the stock is-
sued directly to an employee for prior services. In that case, the regula-
tions presumably would treat all of the stock as having been issued to the
proprietor in exchange for the assets of his business, and the proprietor
would be deemed to have immediately transferred ten per cent of such
stock to pay his obligation to his employee." As a result of such treatment,
the employee would have compensation income in an amount equal to
the fair market value of the stock received,"s and the transferor would
have a deduction under section 162, or section 212, for compensation paid
in a like amount. However, the proprietor might lose a substantial part
of the benefit arising from such deduction due to the fact that he would be
deemed to have disposed of the stock in cancellation of a debt." If the
amount of the debt discharged, presumably measured by the value of the
stock transferred to the employee, exceeded the proprietor's tax basis in the
stock transferred, gain (perhaps capital gain") would result which would
partially or completely offset the deduction for compensation paid. If the
transferor's basis in the stock exceeded the debt discharged, the resulting
loss, unless disallowed under section 267 by virtue of a tainted relationship,
would, of course, increase the proprietor's deduction.
In considering cases where stock has been issued for services rendered
to the predecessor entity, the courts have either avoided or confused the
issue and have not taken the approach suggested by the regulations. In
Roberts Co." certain attorneys had a contingent fee arrangement with
the owners of certain property. Such fee arrangement was made prior to
the transfer of such property to a corporation. Upon incorporation, the
attorneys received approximately twenty-three per cent of the stock for
their interest in the property arising under the contingent fee arrangement.
The Tax Court found that the attorneys had an equitable interest in the
land transferred, and, therefore, had transferred property to the corpora-
tion. Assuming that the attorneys had reported the value of their equitable
interest in the property as taxable income prior to the time such interest
was transferred to the corporation, the case was properly decided. If,
however, the value of the equitable interest had not been previously re-
ported, the Tax Court erroneously allowed the attorneys to escape tax-
"Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1) (1955).
64 id.
"Id. S 1.351-1 (b) (2), example (1).
"Id. (last sentence).
5" This assumes that the obligation arose in a trade or business of the transferor, or in an
activity to which S 212 applies.
"Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(2), example (1) (1955) (last sentence).
5"A serious question of collapsibility could arise if the new corporation receives tainted assets,
particularly if substantial unrealized receivables have been transferred by the predecessor entity.
Collapsible treatment would, of course, cause the transferor's gain to be treated as ordinary gain.
'05 T.C. 1 (1945), acquiesced in, 1945 CUM. BULL. 6.
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ation on their fee income. There is no suggestion in the opinion that all
of the stock might have been constructively issued to the original property
owners with an immediate transfer of twenty-three per cent of the stock
in payment of the contingent fee. The case arose under the predecessor of
section 351, and, at that time, the regulations did not contain the con-
cept outlined above.
A more difficult case to explain is United States v. Frazell. There, the
taxpayer was entitled to a thirteen per cent contingent interest in oil
properties owned by a joint venture by virtue of having performed geo-
logical services for such venture. Shortly before the contingent interest
was to vest, the joint venture was incorporated, and the taxpayer received
thirteen per cent of the corporation's stock in exchange for his contingent
interest. Without precisely deciding the issue, the Fifth Circuit found that
the taxpayer had received either a capital interest in a partnership for
services," or stock for prior services to the corporation under section 351 .
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit referred to the regulations under section
351 dealing with stock or securities issued for services rendered or to be
rendered for the benefit of the issuing corporation." Clearly, in Frazell the
services were rendered for the predecessor joint venture, and the stock-for-
services rule of section 351 should not have been applied." Assuming,
however, that section 351 did apply and that the thirteen per cent stock
interest was received for services, it is submitted that the Fifth Circuit
should have found that all of the stock of the corporation had been con-
structively issued to the other venturers, and that thirteen per cent of such
stock was immediately transferred to the taxpayer as compensation for
prior services to the joint venture. Under this view, the tax position of
the recipient of the stock would not have changed, but the consequences to
the other venturers would have been more properly reflected." Of course,
6'335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
e"Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956). Presumably, under this alternative, the other joint
venturers would have a deduction under § 162 (a) equal to the value of the capital interest trans-
ferred, and would recognize gain or loss equal to the difference between such value and their basis
in the interest transferred.
0 Id. S 1.351-1 (a) (1) (i). Under this alternative, the corporation would be entitled to a de-
duction (see text accompanying notes 11, 12 supra) and would recognize no gain or loss upon
issuance of its stock (see text accompanying note 10 supra).
" In the author's view, reference to S 3 51 is in error, since at the time the services were ren-
dered the facts indicate that the corporation did not exist, nor was its existence contemplated.
Therefore, it is obvious that the services were rendered for the benefit of the joint venture, not
the corporation. Cf. William A. James, 53 T.C. 63 (1969), discussed in text accompanying note
37 supra, for a case involving facts justifying a holding that services were "for the benefit of"
a corporation, even though such corporation did not actually exist at the time the services were
rendered.
" Even if § 351 did not apply and the taxpayer was deemed to have received an interest in
the joint venture (presumably a partnership under § 761 and therefore subject to the provisions
of subchapter K) prior to incorporation, a substantial conflict exists as to whether such interest
should have been taxable upon receipt or should have been nontaxable under the "pool of capital"
theory of G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 214. The Frazell decision has been highly criticized
because of its conclusion that the recipient was taxable upon receipt of the interest. See Smith,
Confusion Twice Confounded-The Service Partner In and Out of the Partnership, in 19TH IN-
STITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 371, 407 (1968).
" Under this approach, of course, the other joint venturers would have a deduction for the
value of the stock constructively transferred, and would recognize gain or loss equal to the
difference between such value and their basis in the stock. This approach would have produced a
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the tax consequences of the incorporation to the other venturers were not
before the court, and it was unnecessary for the Fifth Circuit to consider
this approach. It may be possible to rationalize the result of Frazell, though
not the court's reasoning, by arguing that the other venturers transferred
the property to the corporation for eighty-seven per cent of the stock,
and that the corporation assumed their obligation to the taxpayer and
discharged such obligation by issuing thirteen per cent of the stock."'
D. Property Created by Personal Services
Property created by the prior personal efforts of the transferor would
seem to qualify as property for purposes of section 351. For example, a
secret process created by a transferor through his own efforts, and not at
the request of the transferee corporation, should be property for purposes
of section 351 . For a number of years, however, the IRS labored with
the problem of transfers of know-how, secret processes, patents, trade-
marks, and other such intangible assets under section 351. In 1964, Reve-
nue Ruling 64-560" was issued in an attempt to establish guidelines for
section 351 transfers of such assets. In that ruling, the Service stated that
the term "property" for purposes of section 351 would include "anything
qualifying as 'secret processes and formulae' within the meaning of sec-
tions 861 (a) (4) and 862 (a) (4) of the Code, and any other secret in-
formation as to a device, process, etc., in the general nature of a paten-
table invention without regard to whether a patent has been applied for
[and] without regard to whether it is patentable in the patent law
sense. 7' The ruling further stated that other information which was
secret in nature would be given consideration as "property" on a case-by-
case basis.
Under the ruling, if the asset being transferred is "property," the trans-
fer will be tax-free under section 351, even though services were used to
produce the property. If, however, the information transferred has been
developed especially for the transferee, the stock received in exchange
for such information may be treated as payment for services rendered.
If the transferor agrees to perform services which are merely ancillary or
subsidiary to the property transferred, tax-free treatment will be allowed
under section 351. Where both property and services are furnished as a
consideration and the services are not merely ancillary and subsidiary, a
reasonable allocation of the stock received must be made between com-
pensation and the property transferred.
result for the other joint venturers identical to that discussed in note 62 supra under the partner-
ship alternative.
" Presumably, under this alternative, the corporation would get no deduction since it is merely
paying an assumed obligation. See B. BITTKER & C. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 99 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BITTrKER & EusTiCE];
Paul & Kalish, Transition from a Partnership to a Corporation, N.Y.U. 1 8TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 639, 656-58 (1960); Tritt & Spencer, Current Tax Problems in Incorporation of a Going
Business, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 71, 98-99. Of course, the corporation would recognize
no gain or loss on the issuance of its stock by virtue of § 1032(a).6 8 Cf. Wall Prods., Inc., 11 T.C. 51, 57 (1948), acquiesced in, 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 4.
69 Rtv. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 133.70 1d. at 134.
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The ruling specifically provides that the rendering of certain types of
services after the transfer might cause a portion of the stock to be treated
as compensation. Such services include:
1. Training the transferee's employees, unless the transferee's em-
ployees already have the particular skills required to operate the
transferred process;
2. Continuing technical assistance after start-up; and
3. Assistance in the construction of a plant.
However, services performed (1) by promoting the transaction through
demonstrating and explaining the use of the property; (2) by assisting
in the effective "start-up" of the property transferred; or (3) by per-
forming under a guarantee relating to such effective start-up will ordi-
narily be treated as ancillary and subsidiary to the property transfer.
Revenue Ruling 64-56 concludes that the transfer of all substantial
rights in the secret process or other intangible property will be treated
as a transfer of property under section 351. It further concludes that
limited transfers will also qualify, provided the transferred rights extend
to all of the territory of one or more countries and consist of all sub-
stantial rights to the process or other property within the specified country
or countries. 1
The requirements of Revenue Ruling 64-56 involve substantial issues of
both fact and law, and they have created numerous problems in obtaining
an advance ruling for transfers to foreign corporations under section 367.
As a result, in the latter part of 1969, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure
69-19," which sets forth requirements which must be met in order for an
advance ruling to be issued under section 367 relating to a transfer of
know-how to a foreign corporation under section 351. The new pro-
cedure provides that the IRS will accept appropriate representations, and
that, if applicable, the following statement should be included in the re-
quest for ruling:
It is represented that the 'information' being transferred in exchange for
stock under Section 351 is 'property' within the meaning of Revenue Ruling
64-56 . . . and as such is afforded substantial legal protection against unau-
thorized disclosure and use under the laws of the country from which it is
being transferred. It is further represented that any services to be performed
in connection with the transfer of the property are merely ancillary and sub-
sidiary to the property transfer within the meaning of Revenue Ruling 64-56
or the transferor will be compensated by a fee negotiated at arm's length (in
consideration other than stock or securities of the transferee unless such stock
or securities are identified) for any other services to be performed on behalf
of the transferee."
Revenue Procedure 69-19 also sets forth certain specific information
which must be provided in the ruling request. The procedure concludes
"'See Lanova Corp., 17 T.C. 1178 (1952), acquiesced in, 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 3. For further
discussion of the transfer of "all substantial rights," see Rev. Rul. 64-56, 1964-1 Cum. BULL.
133, 135 (last two paragraphs).




that if required representations are made by the transferor, the Service will
consider for purposes of the requested ruling that the country in which
the transferee corporation is to operate affords to the transferor substantial
legal protection against unauthorized disclosure and use of the information.
Revenue Procedure 69-19 does not mention, although it may be implicit
by its reference to Revenue Ruling 64-56, the requirement that all sub-
stantial rights under property be transferred or that all substantial rights
for property within one or more countries be transferred. Nevertheless,
it appears that such characteristic should be present in any transfer of
know-how to assure qualification under section 351.
Obviously, Revenue Ruling 64-56 and Revenue Procedure 69-19 are
intended to cover primarily transfers to foreign corporations. Neverthe-
less, they should provide rather definitive guidance as to the views of the
IRS regarding section 351 transfers of intangible property created by
personal services. '
E. Transfer Versus Use
Section 351 (a) requires that property be transferred to the transferee
corporation. It is obvious that Revenue Ruling 64-56 and Revenue Pro-
cedure 69-19 are concerned to some extent with the problem of partial
transfers of rights which might constitute licensing transactions. In Reve-
nue Ruling 69-156, the IRS considered a specific factual situation in-
volving the problem of whether a transferor had actually transferred a
property interest or had merely allowed the transferee corporation to use
the property.
In Revenue Ruling 69-156, a domestic corporation transferred to a
foreign subsidiary, in exchange for stock, the exclusive right to import,
make, use, sell, and sublicense one of the parent company's products in the
country in which the foreign subsidiary was organized and operated. The
foreign subsidiary agreed not to assert the right so granted to prevent
the parent and its other subsidiaries from importing, using, and selling the
product covered by the patent in the foreign subsidiary's country of
operation. The Service held that in order for the grant of patent rights
to constitute a transfer of property under section 351, the grant had to
be made in a transaction which would qualify as a sale or exchange,
rather than as a licensing transaction. The Service concluded that all sub-
stantial rights had not been transferred, and that the transaction did not
come within section 351. As a result, the receipt of the stock of the foreign
subsidiary resulted in ordinary income to the parent corporation.
The reference to the term "sale or exchange" in Revenue Ruling 69-156
seems to be an overextension of the requirement of section 351 which re-
quires only a "transfer of property." The theory of Revenue Ruling 69-
156 conflicts directly with the Tax Court's decision in H. B. Zachry Co.,"0
since the assignment of a carved-out oil payment was not a sale or ex-
"
4 See also Rev. Proc. 70-17, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 41-42, §§ 3.02(4)-(6).
13 1969-1 CuM. BuLL. 101.
7049 T.C. 73 (1967), discussed in text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
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change, but merely an anticipation of income under the law in effect at
the time of the Zacbry decision. Nevertheless, the result of Revenue Rul-
ing 69-156 seems to correspond with the legislative intent of section 351
which requires a transfer of property and not a transfer of the right to
use property. Accordingly, stock issued for the use of property should not
be treated as stock issued for property under section 351.
IV. "ONE OR MORE" TRANSFERORS
A. General
The term "one or more persons" allows individuals, corporations, asso-
ciations, partnerships, trusts, or estates to be transferors for purposes of
section 35 L" Obviously, one transferor can incorporate his sole proprietor-
ship and qualify under section 351. In many cases, however, more than
one transferor is involved. In such situations, it is essential that control
be vested within the group of transferors immediately after the exchange.
In order to satisfy section 351, it is not essential that each transferor con-
vey property to the transferee corporation in exchange for stock or se-
curities at the same time, as long as the rights of the parties have been
previously defined and the exchanges are part of one plan occurring with-
in a reasonable time consistent with orderly procedure."' A wise procedure
in situations where the transfers will not or cannot be simultaneous is to
have a written plan outlining the rights of the parties and, more par-
ticularly, establishing the fact that the transferors will be in control of
the transferee corporation as a result of the contemplated plan.
Ordinarily, when more than one transferor is involved, the consider-
ation received by each transferor is in proportion to the value of the
property transferred by such transferor, but such is not always the case.
Under the 1939 Code, the predecessor of section 351 applied only if the
value of the stock or securities received by a transferor was substantially
in proportion to the value of such transferor's interest in the property
prior to the exchange." The "substantially proportionate" test was elimi-
nated in 1954.s° However, as indicated in the Senate Finance Committee
Report on section 351 of the 1954 Code, other provisions of the Code
may apply to cause a disproportionate issuance of stock or securities to be
a taxable event." The regulations under section 351 indicate that "in
appropriate cases" the issuance of stock or securities will be deemed to
have been made in proportion to the values of property received, and that
some of such stock or securities will then be deemed to have been used
7Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a) (1) (1955). See also TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701 (a) (1), for
the definition of the term "person."
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (1) (1955). See also Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d
479 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940); Rev. Proc. 70-17, 1970 TNT. REV. BULL. No.
27, at 43, § 3.05(3).
" Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b) (5). See Hoffman, The Substantial Proportionment Re-
quirement of Section 112(b)(5), 5 TAx L. REV. 235 (1950).
" The Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1954 Code states that 5 351 of the 1954
Code applies "irrespective of any disproportion of the amount of stock or securities received . . .
as a result of the transfer." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954).
81 Id.
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(1) to make gifts, (2) to pay compensation,"2 or (3) to satisfy other
obligations of the transferor.' Such constructive transfers could consti-
tute taxable gifts or give rise to deductions under section 162, as the case
may be. In the event an obligation of a transferor (whether to pay com-
pensation or some other debt) is satisfied by the constructive transfer,
such transferor would recognize gain or loss equal to the difference between
the amount of the obligation satisfied and his basis in the stock construc-
tively transferred.84 Since the regulations apply only "in appropriate cases,"
it appears that a disproportion resulting solely from disagreements as to
value among the transferors should not be affected.8'
If the transferor or transferors are deemed to have disposed of enough
stock to lose "control immediately after the exchange" by virtue of the
constructive transfer, the entire transaction might fail if such construc-
tive transfer were an integral part of the plan. Conversely, if there is no
pre-existing obligation to make the constructive transfer, the transferor
or transferors could be deemed to own more stock than actually received
in the transfer so as to make section 3 51 applicable. For example, assume
that A transfers his proprietorship assets to X corporation for seventy
per cent of its stock and causes the remaining thirty per cent to be issued
directly to his employee, B, for past services to the proprietorship. If the
transfer to B is pursuant to a pre-existing obligation, A, the sole trans-
feror of property, would not be in "control" of X corporation immediately
after the exchange, and his transfer would be taxable. If, however, the
constructive transfer was not pursuant to such an obligation, A might be
able to argue that he constructively owned 100 per cent of the X stock
immediately after the exchange, thereby making section 351 applicable."
However, such an argument would be extremely difficult to sustain due
to the fact that A never actually owned the stock.
B. Combining Section 351 with a Tax-Free Reorganization
From time to time a situation will arise in which one or more non-cor-
porate taxpayers and one or more corporate taxpayers propose to combine
their properties by transferring them to a new corporation. The corporate
transferor hopes to qualify the transaction as a tax-free reorganization
under section 368 (a) (1) (A) or section 368 (a) (1) (C), in order that
the subsequent receipt of the stock of the transferee corporation by its
shareholders will be tax free under section 354. If the transaction is not a
reorganization but qualifies only under section 351, the transaction would
be taxable to the transferor corporation's shareholders. Since an exchange
by a noncorporate transferor cannot qualify as a reorganization, the trans-
82See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
"
5Treas. Reg. 5 1.351-1(b)(1) (1955).84 d. § 1.351-1(b)(2), example (1) (last sentence); see note 59 supra.
"The original proposed regulations under § 351 would have required a realignment of stock
or securities whenever a disproportion existed. See 19 Fed. Reg. 8237, 8268 (1954). The final
regulations limit the realignment requirement to "appropriate cases." Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b)(1)
(1955). But see Rev. Proc. 70-17, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 27, at 42-43, § 3.04(4).
88 See text accompanying notes 120-41 infra.
"
7 Cf. Dunn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Okla. 1966).
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action, as a whole, must be characterized as a transfer under section 351,
with the transferors being in control immediately thereafter.
The IRS considered this problem in Revenue Ruling 68-357,"8 which
involves a situation in which three corporations and a sole proprietor trans-
ferred their assets to a corporation in exchange for voting stock of the
transferee corporation. The four transferors were in control of the trans-
feree corporation immediately after the exchange. The three corporate
transferors were liquidated, and the stock of the transferee corporation
was distributed to the shareholders of the three transferor corporations.
The Service held that the exchanges of property by the transferor corpo-
rations and the proprietorship solely for voting stock of the transferee
corporation constituted a section 351 transaction, inasmuch as the trans-
ferors were in control of the transferee corporation immediately after the
exchanges within the meaning of section 368 (c). By virtue of section
351 (c), which disregards, for purposes of determining control, the fact
that a corporate transferor distributes part or all of the stock received in
a section 351 transaction to its shareholders, the immediate distributions
of the transferee corporation's stock by the three transferor corporations
were ignored. The transaction was treated as a reorganization under section
368 (a) (1) (C) with respect to the three transferor corporations so as to
allow tax-free receipt of the stock by their shareholders under section
354. Hence, no gain or loss was recognized by the proprietorship, the
three transferor corporations, or their shareholders.
Revenue Ruling 68-357 leaves two significant questions unanswered.
First, would the same result be obtained if the three transferor corporations
had been merged into the transferee in a reorganization qualifying under
section 368 (a) (1) (A)? Secondly, would the same result be obtained if
there had been only one corporate transferor?
In a statutory merger qualifying under section 368 (a) (1) (A), the
transferor corporation becomes a part of the acquiring corporation on the
effective date of the merger by operation of law."' In such a case, it is
difficult to prove that the transferor corporation ever received the stock
of the transferee. Under the approach of Revenue Ruling 68-357, there-
fore, the merged corporation might not be considered a transferor. The
IRS has never formally ruled on this subject, but it should rule favorably,
regardless of the technical distinction between an "A"- and "C"-type
reorganization, because the Service has ruled privately for years that a
merged corporation is deemed to have exchanged its property for stock
under section 361 (a). In order for section 361 (a) to apply to an "A"-type
reorganization, the transferor corporation must have at least constructive
ownership (albeit momentary) of the transferee's stock. In any event, it
is suggested that a ruling be obtained if an "A" reorganization is necessary
in facts similar to Revenue Ruling 68-357.
88 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 144.
' In a "C"-type reorganization, the acquired corporation effectively "sells" its assets for the
stock of the acquiring corporation. Upon the receipt of the stock, the corporation usually liqui-
dates, distributing the acquired stock to its shareholders. Such corporation may, however, continue
to exist as a holding company. Rev. Rul. 68-358, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 156.
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In many cases, one or more noncorporate taxpayers propose to combine
their property with that of a single corporate taxpayer. A transfer to the
existing corporation under section 351 is not acceptable because the non-
corporate transferors may not acquire the necessary control. A solution
sometimes suggested is to form a new corporation and have both the non-
corporate and corporate parties transfer their properties to the new cor-
poration in exchange for voting stock. The corporate transferor is then
liquidated, distributing the stock of the corporate transferee to its share-
holders. The transaction could then presumably be accorded the treat-
ment found in Revenue Ruling 68-357. However, in Revenue Ruling
68-349,"° the IRS considered such a plan and held that as to the corporate
transferor, the transaction was a reorganization under section 368(a)-
(1) (F). Since the noncorporate transferors did not control the new cor-
poration immediately after the exchange, section 351 did not apply to their
exchanges. The Service found that it was "apparent that [the new corpo-
ration] was organized for the purpose of enabling [the noncorporate trans-
ferors] to transfer the appreciated assets without the recognition of gain."91
Indirectly, the Service applied the "business purpose" test and found tax
avoidance to be the sole purpose for the transaction. The result of Revenue
Ruling 68-349 is the same as if the noncorporate transferors had trans-
ferred their properties directly to the existing corporation.
Revenue Ruling 68-349 can be distinguished from Revenue Ruling
68-357, since in the later ruling there was no single, existing corporation
to which the noncorporate transferor's assets could have been transferred.
A realignment of corporate entities was necessary in Revenue Ruling 68-
357 so that all the assets could be held within one corporate structure.
Revenue Ruling 68-349 leaves open the possibility that the shareholders
of a corporation could transfer their stock in the corporation to the new
corporation and the noncorporate transferors could transfer their property
to such new corporation. As a result, the new corporation would own di-
rectly the properties transferred by the noncorporate transferors and
hold the existing corporation as a subsidiary. It would be essential that
the existing coporation not be liquidated as part of the plan, because the
net effect would be a "C"-type reorganization" and Revenue Ruling 68-
349 would apply. Further, the new corporation should not transfer the
acquired assets to either the existing corporation or a new subsidiary be-
cause of the potential "double" section 351 problem discussed below."
Because of the uncertainty created by Revenue Ruling 68-349, this alter-
native should be used with care and only after evaluating the risk of chal-
lenge by the Service.
C. Transistory Ownership
For many years, some noncorporate taxpayers have held false hopes
that section 351, or its predecessors, would provide insulation from tax-
" 1968-2 GUM. BULL. 143.
91 Id.
92 See BITTKER & EUSTICE 524.
" See text accompanying note 100 infra.
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ation in situations where an offer is received for property held by a non-
corporate taxpayer, such property is transferred to a corporation under
section 351, and such corporation is immediately acquired in a tax-free
reorganization. For example, in West Coast Marketing Corp.,4 a closely-
held corporation and its sole shareholder owned interests in two adjacent
tracts of land. At the time when a taxable disposition of such land was
about to be consummated for stock in a publicly-held corporation, a new
corporation was formed and the land was transferred to such new cor-
poration for stock, ostensibly under section 351. Subsequently, the stock
of the new corporation was exchanged for stock in the publicly-held com-
pany in a "B"-type reorganization. Shortly thereafter, the new corporation
was dissolved. The Tax Court found that the new corporation was not
organized or used for any bona fide business purpose, and, relying upon
the rationale of Gregory v. Helvering," held that the substance of the
transaction was a taxable exchange of land for publicly-held stock.
The most recent pronouncement on the transitory ownership problem
is found in Revenue Ruling 70-140." In that ruling, an individual owned
a proprietorship and all of the stock of a corporation engaged in a simi-
lar business. Pursuant to an agreement with an unrelated corporation, the
individual transferred the assets of the proprietorship to his wholly-owned
corporation in exchange for additional shares of that corporation's stock.
The individual then exchanged all of the stock of his wholly-owned cor-
poration for stock of the unrelated corporation in a "B"-type reorganiza-
tion. The IRS ruled that the two steps were part of a prearranged plan
and could not be considered independently of each other for federal in-
come tax purposes. The receipt by the individual of the additional stock of
his wholly-owned corporation in exchange for the proprietorship assets
was merely transitory and without substance for tax purposes, since it
was apparent that the assets of the proprietorship were transferred for the
purpose of enabling the unrelated corporation to acquire such assets with-
out the recognition of gain to the individual. Accordingly, the individual
was deemed to have sold his proprietorship assets to the unrelated corpo-
ration."
The principle of West Coast Marketing Corp. and Revenue Ruling 70-
140 has been applied many times to overcome the device of using section
351 as a method of avoiding a taxable exchange."' The rationale applied
by the courts in these cases is strongly reminiscent of the business purpose
requirement of a tax-free reorganization developed by the Supreme Court
in Gregory v. Helvering. The general applicability of the business purpose
doctrine to section 351 transactions is discussed in a subsequent section of
this Article.
9446 T.C. 32 (1966).
'293 U.S. 465 (1935).
1970 "INT. REV. BuLL. No. 13, at 11.
9 That portion of the stock of the wholly-owned corporation not received in the tainted ex-
change was deemed to have been exchanged in a "B"-type reorganization.
° Cf. Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937); Handbird Holding
Corp., 32 B.T.A. 238 (1935), appeal dismissed (2d Cir. 1936).
O'See text accompanying notes 266-76 infra.
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The transient ownership cases may give rise to problems in perfectly
innocent tax planning situations. Such problems might arise in the situ-
ation where property is transferred to a corporation for all of its stock
under section 351 and the transferee corporation immediately transfers all
or some part of such property, for some reason other than tax avoidance,
to a wholly-owned subsidiary in exchange for stock. In such a situation,
the transferors obviously have complied with the requirements of section
351 in their transfer to the first corporation, and the parent corporation
has met the requirements of section 351 for its transfer to the subsidiary.
However, the original transferors are not in control of the ultimate re-
cipient of the property. Without question, section 351 should apply to both
transactions. The IRS, however, has informally indicated difficulty in
finding control in the original transferors, for purposes of section 351,
if the two transactions are part of one plan.0' In order to avoid the prob-
lem, the transferors might transfer the properties to a new corporation
under section 3 51, and then transfer the stock of the new corporation to
the original transferee corporation. As long as the second transfer is not
pursuant to a legally binding obligation, the Service should apply section
351 to each transaction. The Service has so ruled privately in the past,
but it is suggested that an advance ruling be obtained in such cases to
avoid problems arising from technical factual differences.
E. Transfers of Partnership Assets
Whenever a partnership is incorporated, problems may arise as to the
method to be used to accomplish the tax-free transfer of the business to
a new corporation. The first and simplest method is a direct transfer of
the assets and liabilities of the partnership to the corporation with the
corporation issuing its stock to the partnership and with a subsequent
distribution of such stock to the partners. The second method is to have
the assets and liabilities which are to be transferred distributed to the
partners in partial or complete liquidation with the partners conveying
such assets and liabilities to the corporation. The third is to have all
partnership interests transferred to the corporation, thereby terminating
the partnership.
The Service considered these three possibilities in Revenue Ruling 70-
239,01 and held that the federal income tax consequences of each alter-
native were the same. The partnership in each situation is deemed to be
the transferor and the subsequent distribution of stock to the partners in
proportion to their partnership interests, where applicable, was held not
to violate the control requirements of section 368 (c). Since, in each of
the situations enumerated in the ruling, the partnership was completely
liquidated or terminated, it was held that the basis of stock received by
a partner was determined under the provisions of section 732 (b).
100 See text accompanying notes 120-41 infra.
'0' 1970 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 1.
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The ruling does not discuss two possible problems which might arise
in incorporating a partnership. The first problem is where the partnership
transfers its assets to the corporation and causes the corporation to issue
its stock directly to the partners rather than to the partnership. In such a
situation, there is authority that the partnership constructively received
the stock and distributed it to the partners.1 " The fact that the partnership
never actually held the stock seems to be immaterial. This position, of
course, is in accord with the rule of section 351 (c) which permits a cor-
porate transferor to distribute stock received in a section 351 transaction
to its stockholders without violating the control requirement. In order to
avoid any possible problem, however, it would appear advisable to have
the stock issued to the partnership and then distributed to the partners.
The second problem may arise where a partner's basis in his partnership
interest differs from the partnership's tax basis in his share of partnership
assets. Such a situation could occur when a partner acquired his interest
by purchase or inheritance."' Where the tax basis in a partner's interest
is larger than his portion of the partnership's tax basis in assets, it is pos-
sible that the indirect transfer method, whereby the partnership assets are
distributed to the partners in liquidation of the partnership and the part-
ners transfer such assets to the corporation, might create a stepped-up
basis for the transferred assets without adverse tax consequences.1 ' On
the other hand, if a partnership's tax basis in its assets exceeds the part-
ner's basis in his interest, such a procedure could result in a reduction in
basis. In either case, if the assets are distributed by the partnership to the
partners in complete liquidation of the partnership, each partner will re-
ceive a basis in such assets equal to his basis in his partnership interest."
In order to achieve the possible increase in basis, the distributions must be
in complete liquidation of the partnership, since in nonliquidating distri-
butions, the partnership's tax basis in the distributed property carries over
and becomes the partner's tax basis in such assets." If a significant tax
benefit is received through this technique, the IRS would no doubt con-
tend that the partnership liquidation and the transfer to the new corpora-
tion were part of one plan, and that the result achieved is the same as if
there had been a direct transfer by the partnership."'
V. "CONTROL"
A. General
In order for section 351 to apply, the transferors as a group must be in
control of the transferee corporation immediately after the exchange.
Since section 351 applies not only to transfers to a newly organized cor-
poration, but also to transfers of property to a corporation already con-
"'Miller Bros. Elec., Inc., 49 T.C. 446, 451 (1968).




'"The theory of Rev. Rul. 70-239, 1970 INT. REV. BULL. No. 20, at 15, would support this
reconstruction by the Internal Revenue Service.
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trolled by the transferor or transferors,' it is not necessary that control
result from the exchange. The essential test is the status of control im-
mediately after the exchange.
B. The Eighty Per Cent Test
The term "control," as used in section 351, is defined in section 368 (c)
as ownership of (1) at least eighty per cent of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and (2) at least eighty per
cent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the trans-
feree corporation. Only outstanding stock, and not authorized but un-
issued stock or treasury stock,' is considered in determining control.
Further, options to purchase stock are disregarded." ' No attribution rules
apply for purposes of determining control under section 368 (c) ."' Hence,
only stock owned directly by the transferors is considered in ascertaining
whether control exists for purposes of section 351.
There is no requirement that voting rights be proportionate to the
value of the assets transferred by the transferors. In George M. Holstein,
III"' one transferor conveyed property valued at $16,710 for 210 shares
of one dollar par value, voting common stock and 16,500 shares of one
dollar par value, nonvoting preferred stock, and two others acquired 210
shares of one dollar par value, voting common stock for $210 cash in a
section 351 transaction. The Tax Court did not find the disproportion in
voting rights objectionable under section 351.
In some cases, allocation of voting rights can be helpful in accomplishing
the desired balance of power in the new corporate structure. For example,
the general partner of a limited partnership which is to be incorporated
may hold a relatively small interest in the partnership, but desire to re-
tain effective control of the new corporation. By proper allocation of the
voting rights among more than one class of stock, such control can be
achieved. Care must be taken, of course, that the relative values of the
classes of stock do not create a "stock for services" problem with respect
to the general partner."'
The determination of control presents no problem, of course, in cases
where the transferor or transferors own 100 per cent of all classes of out-
standing stock of the transferee corporation, or more than eighty per cent
of the common stock if it is the only class of stock outstanding after the
transfer. If there is more than one class of stock outstanding and the trans-
feror or transferors do not own all of each class of outstanding stock, any
one or more of the following phrases may create a problem in determining
control: (1) "total combined voting power"; (2) "stock entitled to vote";
and (3) "all other classes of stock."
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (2), example (3) (1955).
'o'Louangel Holding Corp. v. Anderson, 9 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); American Bantam
Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 920 (1950).
". American Wire Fabrics Corp., 16 T.C. 607 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 CUM. BULL. 1.
"'See Rev. Rul. 56-613, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 212, 213.
"223 T.C. 923 (1955).
113 See text accompanying notes 39-48 suPra.
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The phrase "total combined voting power" seemingly allows a mere
counting of voting rights, while totally disregarding the number of shares
involved and the relative fair market values of the shares. In the consoli-
dated return area, the power to elect directors is considered controlling in
determining total voting power.114 Presumably, the same test would apply
for purposes of section 3 51. The mere right of a class of stock to vote only
on extraordinary events, such as a merger or liquidation, should not re-
quire that such class of stock be considered in the determination of "total
combined voting power. 1. 5 An early Board of Tax Appeals decision indi-
cates that control means actual ownership of stock and does not require
exercise of voting rights.' Assuming that the rationale of that case still
applies, voting trusts or other shareholder agreements relating to voting
rights presumably should not be considered when computing "total com-
bined voting power," although the Service may take a contrary view.11'
Neither the statute nor the regulations define "stock entitled to vote."
As indicated above, stock which under state law votes only on an extraor-
dinary event should not be deemed to be "stock entitled to vote" for
purposes of determining control under section 351."' The proper test for
determining "stock entitled to vote" should be whether such stock has the
right to vote for directors, but this test has not been formally adopted by
the IRS for purposes of section 351.
In considering ownership of "other classes of stock," the total number
of shares of such stock, rather than the relative values of such stock, must
be considered. Section 368(c) would seem to group all classes of non-
voting stock together for purposes of determining eighty per cent owner-
ship. The Service, however, has ruled that in order to meet the eighty-
per-cent-of-all-other-classes-of-stock test, the transferors must own eighty
per cent of the total number of shares of each class of such stock."'
VI. "IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EXCHANGE"
A. General
Perhaps the most troublesome and most litigated issue relating to section
351 is the determination of whether the transferors have control of the
transferee corporation immediately after the exchange. Of course, if such
control is absent, section 351 will not apply to prevent recognition of
gain or loss.
The question of control immediately after the exchange has been
'14Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 218; I.T. 3896, 1948-1 CUM. BULL. 72. See also
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 29 B.T.A. 443 (1933), aff'd, 81 F.2d 971 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 676 (1936).
1"'Cf. Treas. Reg. S 1.302-3 (a) (195S), which states that such stock is not generally "voting
stock" until the specified event occurs.
" Federal Grain Corp,, 18 B.T.A. 242 (1929).
" Cf. Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 341, which indicates that voting agreements
among shareholders create more than one class of stock for purposes of subchapter S treatment.
118See note 115 supra.
'"Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 GUM. BULL. 115.
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thoroughly discussed by commentators,"' the courts.' and the IRS."' Al-
though the conclusions of such parties are not in complete agreement, it
appears that the test of whether such requirement is met is whether the
section 351 transaction would have been consummated but for the trans-
action or transactions causing the transferors to lose control. The Tax
Court stated this test rather succinctly in the American Bantam Car Co.
case, as follows: "An important test [in determining control immediately
after the exchange] is that of mutual interdependence. Were the steps so
interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would
have been fruitless without a completion of the series?""
The problem of control immediately after the exchange may arise in a
number of different contexts. An attempt has been made in the succeeding
sections to describe the factual patterns in which the problem most fre-
quently appears, and to discuss with respect to each such factual pattern
the difficulties which may arise under the "immediately after" test.
B. Sales of Stock by Transferors or
Issuance of Additional Stock by Corporation
On many occasions, a new corporation will be formed expressly for the
purpose of subsequently becoming a publicly-held corporation. Such status
may, of course, be achieved either by a sale of stock by the transferors,
or by issuance of additional stock by the transferee corporation. It ap-
pears obvious that if a person transfers property to a new corporation in
exchange for stock and has previously entered into a binding agreement to
sell more than twenty per cent of the stock received, such sale should dis-
qualify the section 351 transaction. For example, in May Broadcasting Co.
v. United States"' the Eighth Circuit found that a subsequent sale of
stock disqualified a purported section 351 transaction even though the
sale of such stock was approximately eighteen months after the exchange
of property for stock. The delay was necessitated by the required approval
of such sale by a governmental agency. The court found that the delay
did not prevent the subsequent sale from being treated as part of the
overall plan.1 '
On the other hand, where the subsequent sale is separated from the
section 351 transaction by a period of time and is merely contemplated
at the time the section 351 transaction occurs, such subsequent sale
should not disqualify the section 3 51 transaction. In National Bellas Hess,
Inc." it was contemplated at the time of the section 3 51 transaction that
the corporation would issue additional shares of its stock for cash, since
" BITTKER & EUSTICE 89-94; Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations,
N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 247 (1954).
"'See, e.g., American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
122Rev. Rul. 54-96, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 111.
123 11 T.C. 397, 405 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920
(1950).
124200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953).
'2See also Manhattan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032 (1957), acquiesced in, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 5.
12020 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955).
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additional funds were needed to conduct its business. At the time of the
section 351 transaction, however, there was no obligation to issue such
stock. The Tax Court found that the subsequent sale did not affect the
section 351 transaction, because of the lack of a binding obligation to is-
sue such stock at the time of the section 351 transaction, and because of
the passage of a substantial period of time before the subsequent sale.
Other cases have followed the rule of National Bellas Hess, Inc. where the
facts indicated that the seller was not committed to sell additional stock
at the time the section 351 transaction occurred."'
Perhaps the leading case dealing with subsequent dispositions of stock
by transferors is American Bantam Car Co."' There, property was trans-
ferred to a corporation in exchange for all of its common stock on June
3, 1936. Five days later the new corporation entered into a contract with
an underwriter for the sale of its preferred stock. Under that agreement,
the underwriter was to receive 100,000 shares of common stock from the
transferors over a specified period of time if and when the preferred stock
was sold. In October 1937, more than twenty per cent of the common
stock was transferred to the underwriter. The Tax Court held that the
transferors had the required control in June 1936, and that the subsequent
loss of such control was not an integral part of the section 351 transaction.
The court found that there was no binding commitment in existence on
the date of the section 351 transaction, but only an oral understanding of
the plan.
In today's rush to the public marketplace, although depressed at the
moment, the effect of a public sale of stock might have an unfavorable
effect on the tax-free nature of a section 351 incorporation which pre-
ceded the public offering. It seems clear that American Bantam Car Co.
would protect a section 3 51 transaction where there was no underwriting
agreement in existence at the time of the transfer. Further, it would seem
that if a binding underwriting agreement were not executed until after
the transferors had executed a legally enforceable contract to make their
transfers to the corporation, such subsequent underwriting agreement
would not affect the section 3 51 transaction. It would seem that a pre-
requisite to such a contract would be that the transferors be legally obli-
gated to make the transfers of property to the corporation even if the
Securities and Exchange Commission rejected the corporation's registration
statement.
If an underwriting agreement has been executed, the consequences of
such an agreement might depend upon the type of underwriting contem-
plated. If the agreement provides for a "firm" underwriting, whereby the
underwriter will purchase a specified number of shares directly from the
corporation, it would seem that the underwriter could qualify as a trans-
feror if his purchase of the stock were part of the overall section 3 51 trans-
12'See, e.g., Lodi Iron Works, 29 T.C. 696 (1958); John C. O'Connor, 16 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 213 (1957).
128 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
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action. In Hartman Tobacco Co.' an underwriter and several other trans-
ferors transferred cash and other property to a new corporation in ex-
change for all of its stock. Shortly thereafter, the underwriter sold substan-
tially all of his stock to the general public. The Tax Court held that the
underwriter was a transferor, and that his subsequent sale of stock did not
disqualify the section 351 transaction because at the time he acquired the
stock he had no binding agreement to sell the stock to outsiders. There-
fore, if a firm underwriting is contemplated and the underwriter has no
obligation to dispose of his shares at the time of the section 351 trans-
action, the subsequent sale of stock should not affect the tax-free nature
of the incorporation. If, however, the underwriter has a binding commit-
ment to dispose of shares sufficient in number to fail the control test, sec-
tion 351 might not apply.
If the underwriting contemplated is to be a "best efforts" underwriting,
whereby the underwriter is not obligated to purchase shares of stock but
agrees to sell shares to the public for the corporation, such an agreement
may disqualify the section 351 transaction. In Overland Corp.2 ° a "best
efforts" underwriting agreement which was part of the overall transaction
was fatal to section 351 treatment. It would seem that the holding in Over-
land Corp. is incorrect, since the purchasers of stock under the "best ef-
forts" offering in that case actually transferred cash to the corporation as
part of the overall section 351 plan.1"' That such persons were not direct-
ly parties to the section 351 plan may have been the basis of the Tax
Court's decision.
It is understood that the IRS recently ruled privately that even where
a letter had been executed expressing an intention to have a public offering
which would reduce the transferors' ownership to less than eighty per
cent, there was no binding commitment or integrated plan to issue ad-
ditional shares. It appears that the Service properly considers a letter of
intent as a contingent agreement and not as a binding obligation.
In any event, where a public offering is contemplated, it would be
advisable to consummate the incorporation prior to beginning negotiations
with an underwriter. If this cannot be done and the public offering in-
volves more than twenty per cent of the stock of the corporation, an ad-
vance ruling should be obtained.
C. Stock Issued for Prior Services
As indicated above,132 the transferors may cause stock to be issued di-
rectly to employees of the predecessor business for past services. It seems
clear from the decided cases that if there is an existing obligation on the
part of the transferors at the time of the incorporation to transfer part
of the stock to an employee, the issuance of such stock to an employee,
12945 B.T.A. 311 (1941), acquiesced in, 1943 CuM. BULL. 11.
"8042 T.C. 26 (1964), nonacquiesced in, 1966-2 CuM. BULL. 8. In this case, the Commissioner
argued that the transaction qualified under the predecessor of 5 351, and apparently the non-
acquiescence relates to the Tax Court's finding on that point.
"' Cf. Treas. Reg. S 1.3 51-1 (a) (1) (1955).
13 See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
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if more than twenty per cent of the stock is involved, will cause disquali-
fication of the section 3 5 1 transaction. ' In Schmieg, Hungate & Kotzian,
Inc.,3 however, the Board of Tax Appeals found that the transfer of
stock to an employee more than twelve months after the date of incor-
poration did not disqualify the section 3 5 1 transaction, even though it ap-
pears from the facts of the case that there was a pre-existing commit-
ment on the part of the transferors to make such a transfer. Obviously,
the court gave considerable weight to the timing of the transfer. It should
be noted that this case was decided in 1932, prior to the lucid enuncia-
tions on the subject of binding commitments and interdependent steps
found in American Bantam Car Co."
D. Gifts by Transferors
Transferors may desire to give a part of their stock to other family
members as gifts. It would seem logical to conclude that such gifts could
be made by having the corporation issue the stock directly to the donees.
In one case, however, where more than twenty per cent of the stock was
transferred directly by the corporation to a son, it was held that the "im-
mediately after" test was not satisfied.13 In another case, a father trans-
ferred twenty-one per cent of the stock to his son immediately after in-
corporating a sole proprietorship, and it was held that the "immediately
after" test was satisfied because immediately after the transaction the
father had the legal right to do whatever he wished with his stock.17 The
difference in methods of making gifts seemingly should not be material
and hardly justifies the difference in result described in the two cases. In
any event, if gifts exceeding twenty per cent of the stock are contem-
plated, all of the stock should be issued to the transferors and the gifts
should be made after the section 3 51 transaction is completed.
E. Effect of Options
In several cases, a transferor has granted an option to a third party to
acquire stock immediately after the exchange. Where the option is exer-
cised, the courts have generally held that the exercise of the option does
not disqualify the section 351 transaction.1"' Presumably, such a conclu-
sion is based upon the fact that the option did not constitute an obligation
to purchase. At least one commentator has indicated that the likelihood of
exercise of the option should be considered, and if exercise is a foregone
l' For cases where stock was issued directly to employees, see Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry
Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948); Majonnier & Sons, 12 T.C. 837 (1949), nonacquiesced in,
1949-2 CuM. BULL. 4. For a case where the stock was issued to the transferors and immediately
transferred to employees, see Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B.T.A. 38 (1940).
1"27 B.T.A. 337 (1932).
1" See text accompanying note 128 supra.
1 Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948). Apparently, under
present law, Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(b) (1) (1955) would permit direct issuance of the stock to
be treated as a gift, but the effect of such direct issuance on control is not clear. See text accom-
panying notes 86, 87 supra.
"'1Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
655 (1943).
l See, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir.
1955); Robert J. Harder, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 494 (1958).
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conclusion, such option might well disqualify section 351 treatment.189
This approach would place the IRS in a position of superimposing its judg-
ment on the facts in hindsight, and, if any option were exercised, the
Service would no doubt conclude that such exercise was a foregone con-
clusion. The better rule would be that an option is not an obligation of
the transferor to transfer stock until it is exercised, assuming that the
option is not a sham, and that an option should not affect the validity of
the section 351 transaction.
F. Distributions by a Corporate Transferor
Section 351 (c) provides that in determining control under section 351,
the fact that a corporate transferor immediately distributes to its share-
holders all or any part of the stock it receives may be ignored. Therefore,
if a corporate transferor distributes stock received in a section 351 trans-
action, regardless of the nature of the distribution to the recipient, such
subsequent transaction will not affect the determination of control for
purposes of section 351"14 In Revenue Ruling 68-298,141 where twenty-
five per cent of the stock of a subsidiary was distributed, the Service held
that section 351 (c) would apply if the corporate transferor distributed
the subsidiary's stock received in a section 351 transaction to one of its
shareholders in complete redemption of such shareholder's stock in the
transferor corporation.
VII. "IN EXCHANGE FOR STOCK OR SECURITIES"
A. General
In order to achieve a tax-free transfer of property under section 3 51 (a),
the transfer must be "in exchange for stock or securities" of the transferee
corporation. It is well accepted that the statute is met if stock and securi-
ties are received in the exchange as well as if stock or securities are re-
ceived." As a result, transferors who are in control of the corporation im-
mediately after the exchange may receive securities, as well as stock, in
the exchange without disturbing the tax-free nature of the transaction.
B. Must There Be an Exchange?
Section 351 (a) seems to contemplate and, in fact, require that a trans-
feror receive stock or securities "in exchange" for property. The IRS, how-
ever, takes the position that a contribution of appreciated property to the
capital of a wholly-owned corporation is governed by section 351, pre-
sumably under the theory that the issuance of additional stock or securi-
ties would be a meaningless gesture on the part of the corporation. In Reve-
nue Ruling 64-15 5,14 the Service held that if a domestic corporation con-
tributed depreciated property to a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary, the
119 BITrKER & EusTicE 94.
140 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (1954).
141 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 139.
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(h) (1955).
143 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 138.
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transaction would be considered as an exchange of property for stock
under section 351, regardless of the fact that no additional stock or se-
curities were issued. In that ruling, the Service relied on King v. United
States1' " and Commissioner v. Morgan"s as authority for the proposition
that a transfer by way of contribution to capital of a wholly-owned cor-
poration was within the purview of section 351.
In Morgan the question was whether the transfer by one corporation of
all of its operating assets to another corporation constituted a complete
liquidation under section 115 (c) of the 1939 Code, or a reorganization
under section 112(b) (3) and (c)(1) of the 1939 Code, where there
had been no actual exchange of stock and all of the stock of both corpora-
tions was owned by the same person. The Third Circuit held that an
actual physical exchange of stock was not necessary in order for a re-
organization to have occurred where all of the stock of both corporations
was owned by the same party. In Morgan no section 351 transaction was
involved.
In King the question related to the basis of property transferred to a
corporation. In that case, a taxpayer organized a new corporation and
transferred certain stock to it in exchange for substantially all of the
stock of the new corporation. Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer transferred
additional stock to the new corporation without additional consideration.
Presumably, the reason the second block of stock was not transferred at the
same time as the first block was because the certificate for the second block
was not immediately available. The new corporation sold the second block
of stock approximately six years after the transfer. The Commissioner
claimed that the transfer of the second block of stock was in connection
with a transaction described in section 203 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of
1926 (the predecessor of section 351), and that the basis of such stock
should be determined under section 204 (a) (8) of the Revenue Act of
1926. The taxpayer argued that the basis of such stock to the corporation
was its fair market value on the date of transfer, because there was no sta-
tute in effect for the year in question requiring a carryover of basis in con-
tributions to capital. The district court stated that issuance of additional
stock to a person already owning all of the stock of the transferee corpora-
tion was not material, since the value of all the stock held by him would re-
main substantially the same irrespective of the total number of shares out-
standing. The court then expressed the view that it would do no great vio-
lence to the statute to treat the transactions as if additional securities had
been issued for property. It should be noted, however, that the court also
found that the transfers of both blocks of stock were part of one plan."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the issuance of additional stock
would be a meaningless gesture, and treated the transaction as though there
had been an issuance of securities for property. Both the district court and
14410 F. Supp. 206 (D. Md.), aff'd, 79 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1935).
1-288 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 836 (1962).
14 This finding should have been dispositive of the S 351 issue. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.3 51-1 (a) (I)(1955).
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the Fourth Circuit noted that section 113 (a) (8) of the Revenue Act of
1932 (the predecessor of section 362 (a) of the 1954 Code) would have re-
quired, had it been in effect for the year in question, that the transferee
corporation carry over the basis of the transferor regardless of whether the
transfer had been a contribution of capital or in connection with a section
351 transaction. Obviously, the decision in King was an attempt to reach
the same result for the year in question that would have been reached
had the predecessor of section 362 (a) been in effect for that year. To
this end, the courts held that a constructive section 351 transaction had
occurred.
The question whether an exchange is required under section 351 was
placed squarely before the Tax Court in the recent case of Werner
Abegg." There, the taxpayer made a transfer of stocks to a wholly-owned
foreign corporation as a contribution to capital. The Commissioner con-
tended that the transfer was, in effect, an exchange under section 351, and
that gain was realized upon the transfer of the appreciated stocks be-
cause the taxpayer had not complied with section 367. In support of his
position, the Commissioner relied upon Revenue Ruling 64-155 and the
King and Morgan cases. The Tax Court found that the Morgan case was
distinguishable in that it was concerned with the question of whether a
transfer of a corporation constituted a liquidation or reorganization, and
that the King case was distinguishable because it related to determination
of basis. The Tax Court stated that the sole question with which it was
concerned in Abegg was whether there was in fact an "exchange" as pro-
vided by section 351. The court found that there was no justification in
extending the holdings of the Morgan and King cases to the facts of
Abegg, since such an extension would be contrary to the plain and unam-
biguous language of section 351. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court, based upon a somewhat different and more complicated
analysis of the problem. The Commissioner argued that the holding of
the Tax Court left open a substantial tax avoidance potential whereby
appreciated securities could be contributed to a foreign corporation and
sold in a foreign country without taxation. The Second Circuit found
that section 901 of the Revenue Act of 1932 (the predecessor of sec-
tion 1491 of the 1954 Code), which imposed an excise tax on the transfer
of stock or securities by certain taxpayers to a foreign corporation as a
contribution to capital, was enacted to preclude the possibility of tax
avoidance pointed out by the Commissioner. The Second Circuit reasoned
that if section 367 and section 351 apply to a contribution to the capital
of a foreign corporation, section 901 of the Revenue Act of 1932 was un-
necessary, since Congress obviously did not mean that such a contribu-
tion should be subjected to both an income and an excise tax, while an
exchange of such property for stock or securities should be subjected only
to an income tax in the absence of a ruling under section 367.
On the basis of the Abegg decision, it appears that the IRS must look to
141 50 T.C. 145 (1968), aff'd, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Congress to include contributions of capital within the purview of section
367, since the constructive section 351 transaction theory is invalid.'" At
this time, the Service has attempted to apply the theory only to contribu-
tions of capital to foreign corporations, but could attempt to apply it in a
situation where a taxpayer made a bargain sale (i.e., at his cost basis) to a
wholly-owned corporation. In such a situation, the taxpayer obviously in-
tends to contribute the unrealized appreciation to his corporation and re-
cover only his cost. If, however, a constructive section 351 exchange oc-
curs, the payment by the corporation of an amount equal to his cost could
be considered boot under section 351 (b), and gain would be recognized.
Such a result certainly is not justified under section 351 if no stock or se-
curities are issued.
C. Definition of "Stock"
There is no definition of the term "stock" in the Code, the regula-
tions, or the published rulings, but the term is generally considered to
mean an equity interest in a corporation, whether (1) voting or nonvoting,
or (2) common or preferred. Presumably, the term has the same meaning
for section 351 as it has for purposes of sections 354(a) (1) and 361 (a),
which relate to corporate reorganizations. Quite often in "thin capitaliza-
tion" cases the courts will extend the definition of stock to hold that pur-
ported debt is, in effect, stock. 4'
The regulations under section 351 state that stock rights and stock war-
rants do not come within the meaning of the term "stock or securities.""'
'
0
Obviously, such rights do not represent an equity interest in the corpora-
tion until exercised and should not be accorded treatment as either stock
or securities."' Presumably, therefore, the value of such rights, if received
in connection with a section 351 transaction, might well be treated as
boot. ' This result, insofar as it relates to noncompensatory rights or war-
rants, is diffcult to reconcile with the rule of section 305 which allows
shareholders of an existing corporation to receive stock rights or war-
rants tax-free in most instances. A literal reading of section 351, however,
requires such a result. Therefore, care should be taken not to issue rights
or warrants as part of an incorporation transaction.
If a transferor is given a nontransferable contingent right to additional
stock, as contrasted to rights or warrants to acquire stock, such right has
been held to be the equivalent of stock, since only additional stock can be
received pursuant to such right and the transferor cannot sell it. In James
148 Section 1491 applies only to contributions of stock or securities and would not apply to
contributions of other appreciated property. Therefore, a loophole does exist for contributions of
property, other than stock or securities, to a foreign corporation.
14 See Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related
Problems, 16 TAx L. REV. 1 (1960).
sOTreas. Reg. S 1.351-1(a)(1) (1955).
"I Cf. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942), holding that warrants are
not voting stock for purposes of a § 368 (a) (1) (B) reorganization.
's'Cf. William H. Bateman, 40 T.C. 408 (1963), nonacquiesced in, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 7,




C. Hamrick,3 the taxpayer, an inventor, acquired a contractual right to
receive additional shares of stock if a patent which he had transferred to
a corporation under section 351 proved successful. The Tax Court found
that the contingent right was, in substance, the equivalent of stock, since
the holder could receive nothing other than stock under the contract. The
IRS announced in Revenue Ruling 66-112 1" that it would follow Hamrick
under section 3 51 in cases where: (1) the contract right is not specifically
assignable nor readily marketable; (2) the contract right can only give
rise to receipt of additional stock by one who was a party to the section
351 transfer; and (3) a bona fide business purpose exists for not issuing
all of the stock immediately. The ruling further provides that the delayed
issuance will be scrutinized to assure that the additional stock does not
constitute compensation income to the recipient.
D. Definition of "Securities"
As with the term "stock," the term "securities" is not defined in the
Code, regulations, or published rulings, but presumably has the same
meaning as under the reorganization provisions."' The definition of the
term has been confused for a number of years, principally because of
the holding in a reorganization case, Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v.
Commissioner," in which the Supreme Court held that short-term notes
were not securities since such notes were the equivalent of cash. At least
one commentator has indicated that the Pinellas decision has led the courts
to unduly restrict the scope of the term "securities." '".. Because of the pre-
vailing confusion, the IRS has substantially limited its advance ruling
policies in section 351 transactions where securities are involved."'
Although it is difficult to ascertain whether a formal corporate obliga-
tion to a shareholder will be considered a security or ordinary debt, cer-
tain guidelines have been developed which should help determine whether
an obligation constitutes a security. For a time, it was thought that the
name of the obligation was significant, and that "notes" could not qualify
as securities." 9 This approach has little, if any, basis in the court decisions
and should no longer be a consideration in determining the nature of a
debt." The principal factor which the courts have looked to in recent
years is the term of the note. Most practitioners follow the rule of thumb
that obligations payable in five years or less do not qualify as securities
53 43 T.C. 21 (1964), acquiesced in result only, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 2.
114 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 68.
" Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 354(a)(1), 361(a).
1'6287 U.S. 462 (1933).
" Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HATv. L. REV. 705 (1945).
'Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 947. Under § 3.01 (10) (a) of Revenue Procedure
64-31, the Service will not rule on a § 351 transaction involving securities if a "thin corporation"
problem is involved. Under S 4.01(4) of Revenue Procedure 64-31, the Service will not ordinarily
issue advance rulings as to the tax effect of a transfer under § 351 if part of the consideration
received by a transferor consists of bonds, debentures, or other evidences of indebtedness of the
transferee corporation.
" See Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1945);
Weiss, Notes as Securities Within Section 112(b)(3), 26 TAXEs 228 (1948).
' See L & E Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1939) (bonds not securities);
Burnham v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936) (notes held to be securities).
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while those of ten years or more do qualify, although there are exceptions
to the general rule.101
In an interesting recent case, United States v. Mills,6' the Fifth Circuit
found that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding
that the transfer of property by a taxpayer to his own corporation in re-
turn for a $197,879.55, one-year note was a tax-free exchange under
section 351 because the note was a security. In reviewing the jury's ver-
dict, the Court relied upon the test applied by the Tax Court in Camp
Wolters Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner:
The test as to whether notes are securities is not a mechanical determination
of the time period of the note. Though time is an important factor, the con-
trolling consideration is an overall evaluation of the nature of the debt,
degree of participation and continuing interest in the business, the extent of
proprietary interest compared with the similarity of the note to a cash pay-
ment, the purpose of the advances, etc. It is not necessary for the debt obli-
gation to be the equivalent of stock since . . . [section 351] . . . specifically
includes both 'stock' and 'securities.1 163
Apparently, the finding that the one-year note was a security was based
upon evidence that the taxpayer intended the note to remain more or less
indefinitely an obligation of the corporation upon which he would draw
interest to supplement his annual income. Although the case is a refresh-
ing victory for the taxpayer, it will be difficult, in most cases, to prove
that a short-term note will be renewed over a sufficient period to cause it
to be a security." Prior to restricting its ruling policies with respect to
the question of securities under section 351, the IRS issued Revenue Rul-
ing 56-303,6 5 in which it was held that notes of less than four years and
an average life of two-and-one-half years did not qualify as "securities."
However, that ruling was withdrawn, but not revoked, in line with the
IRS's new policy relating to rulings involving securities under section
351 .'" In Revenue Ruling 59_98,17 which involved a reorganization, the
Service ruled that bonds which were payable in from three to ten years
with an average period to maturity of six and one-half years were securities
under section 354. Presumably, since the definition of securities for both
section 351 and reorganization purposes should be identical, this ruling
provides some guidance in planning incorporation transactions.
The payment of notes in installments has given rise to problems in
qualifying an instrument so payable as a security. In one case, Warren H.
16'BnrKER & EUSTiCE 73.
101399 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1968).
1322 T.C. 737, 751 (1954), acquiesced in, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 3, aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th
Cir. 1956).
'"See Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966) (6-month note not
a security, but on remand sub nor. Prentis v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
such notes were held to be securities since they were part of a plan for deferred issuance of pre-
ferred stock); L & E Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1939) (bonds with
average maturity of 2Y/ years held not securities); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932) (notes maturing 1 to 14 months after issuance held not securities).
'5 1 9 5 6 -2 CuM. BULL. 193.
' Rev. Rul. 63-28, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 76.
171959-1 CUM. BULL. 76.
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Brown, "" the Tax Court held that a contract payable in ten annual in-
stallments with interest was not a security because the contract did not
insure a continued participation of the business of the transferee corpo-
ration. Obviously, whether a note is payable in a lump sum at the end of
a period of time or in installments throughout a period of time, the hold-
ers of such instruments have a continuing interest in the affairs of the
corporation for the life of the instrument. It appears that the distinction
of the Brown case is not proper, and that the courts are not following the
restrictive view of Brown. "9
Certain characteristics, if present, may aid in qualifying an instrument
as a security, although because certain of these characteristics are also
characteristics of preferred stock, there is a danger, particularly in a thin
capitalization situation, that a court may find such instrument to be pre-
ferred stock. Such characteristics are:
1. If at all possible, the term of the note should be at least ten years.
Such a time period should be more than sufficient to give the note-
holder the required continuing interest in corporate affairs.
2. The instrument should be in writing, as an open account does not
qualify as a security. ' 0
3. The obligation should be negotiable and registered as a corporate
security.
4. The obligation should be secured to the extent possible by corpo-
rate assets.
5. The note should provide for interest of at least four per cent per
171
annum.
Hopefully, as a result of the enactment of section 385 as part of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, the IRS will issue authoritative regulations de-
fining the difference between stock and debt. That new provision specifi-
cally authorizes the issuance of regulations to determine whether an in-
terest in a corporation is to be treated as stock or debt. If these regu-
lations define an obligation as a debt, it will then be necessary for the tax-
payer to be in a position to prove that such debt is a security.
Even though an obligation can not qualify as a security under section
351, it may, nevertheless, qualify as "other property." Hence, if the trans-
feror receiving such obligation also receives stock, such non-qualifying
obligation should be considered boot under section 351 (b), and the rules
applying to taxation of boot would be applied.
VIII. "SOLELY"-RECEIPT OF BOOT
A. General
No gain or loss is recognized under section 3 51 if an exchange is solely
16827 T.C. 27 (1956), acquiesced in, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 4.
'"9See United States v. Hertwig, 398 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1968) (12Y/-year installment notes
held to be securities); George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203 (1968), acquiesced in, 1969-2 CUM. BULL.
xxv (10-year installment notes held to be securities).
1
. See John W. Harrison, 24 T.C. 46 (1955).
""1 Section 483, requiring imputed interest on obligations received upon the sale or exchange of
property where no interest (or insufficient interest) is stated, would appear to apply to securities
issued under 5 351.
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for stock and/or securities of the transferee corporation. If the trans-
ferees receive, in addition to stock and/or securities, cash or other property,
section 351 (b) provides that any gain, as computed under section 1001,
must be recognized to the extent of the boot received.
The operation of section 351 (b) may be illustrated by a simple example.
Assume that a taxpayer transfers property having a tax basis of $50,000
and a fair market value of $150,000 to a corporation under section 351
in exchange for stock having a value of $100,000 and cash and other
property (boot) having a total value of $50,000. Under section 1001, the
transferor would realize a gain of $100,000 (value of stock, cash, and
other property received of $150,000 minus basis in property surrendered
of $50,000). Under the rule of section 351(b), however, the transferor
would recognize a gain of only $50,000, since that is the amount of boot
received. On the other hand, if the stock received had a value of only
$25,000 and the cash and other property had a total value of $125,000,
the transferor would have recognized gain of $100,000, since that
amount is his total gain under section 1001 and it is less than the amount of
boot received. If the property had a basis of more than $150,000 to the
transferor, the transferor would have realized a loss under section 1001,
but under section 351 (b) (2), the loss would not have been recognized.
Even if section 351 (b) (2) allowed recognition of loss, section 267(a) (1)
would, in many cases, prevent such recognition.
B. Nature of Gain
In determining the nature of the gain recognized under section 3 51 (b),
the taxpayer should not assume that such gain is automatically capital
gain, because the underlying nature of the transferred assets will be de-
terminative of the nature of the gain recognized."' Perhaps the most
dangerous provision which must be considered in determining the nature
of gain recognized under section 351 (b) is section 1239, which provides
that gain recognized on the transfer of depreciable property to a corpo-
ration cannot be treated as capital gain if more than eighty per cent in
value of the transferee corporation's stock is owned by the transferor, his
spouse, his minor children, or his minor grandchildren."'
The regulations under section 1239 state that a corporation is controlled
when more than eighty per cent in value of all outstanding stock is bene-
ficially owned by the transferor, his spouse, his minor children, or his
minor grandchildren.' In Mitchell v. Commissioner,' however, the Fourth
Circuit held these regulations invalid. There, the taxpayer, his spouse, and
his minor children owned 79.54 per cent of the stock directly, and 12.21
per cent was owned by two irrevocable trusts for the benefit of his minor
'"Cf. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
173See Rev. Rul. 60-302, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 223. In Rev. Rul. 59-210, 1959-1 CuM. BULL.
217, the Internal Revenue Service held that patents constituted "depreciable property" for purposes
of S 1239. Presumably, therefore, the Service views all intangibles subject to amortization, such
as leasehold interests, as "depreciable property" subject to § 1239.
'"
T Treas. Reg. S 1.1239-1 (1957).
175300 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1962), rev'g 35 T.C. 550 (1961).
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children. The Commissioner asserted that stock owned beneficially by
the taxpayer's children should be included in determining the taxpayer's
stock ownership. The court found that the legislative history of section
1239 and its sparse statutory language, as contrasted to other attribution
sections which do intend to include beneficial ownership, indicated that
beneficial ownership was not intended to be included under section 1239.
It is submitted that the holding of the Fourth Circuit is correct, and should
be followed by other courts. 7 ' It appears, therefore, that a well-advised
taxpayer may generally plan his family ownership in such a manner as to
avoid section 1239.
In Trotz v. Commissioner1. a taxpayer owning seventy-nine per cent
of the stock of a corporation, and having an option to acquire the remain-
ing twenty-one per cent, sold depreciable assets to the corporation. The
Commissioner asserted that the stock subject to the option was effectively
owned by the taxpayer so as to give him 100 per cent ownership of the
corporation. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer's rights to the twenty-
one per cent stock interest were so complete that they were tantamount to
ownership. The Tenth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, holding that a
contract right to acquire stock was not ownership and that "tantamount
to ownership" was not sufficient for purposes of section 1239. The Tenth
Circuit left open the question whether the shares owned by the taxpayer
represented more than eighty per cent in value of the corporation's stock
and remanded the case to the Tax Court for such determination. On re-
mand, the Tax Court held that the taxpayer did not own more than eighty
per cent in value of the outstanding stock."" The Tax Court found that
the fact that the taxpayer had "control" of the corporation did not in-
crease the value of his stock. This finding appears to have been based on the
fact that the court found that the corporation had no value as a going con-
cern, and that its only value related to its underlying assets.
In United States v. Parker... the Fifth Circuit found that a taxpayer
owning exactly eighty per cent of the stock of a corporation actually
owned more than eighty per cent in value because of restrictions on the
sale of the twenty per cent interest and the control position of the eighty
per cent stockholder. Whether the control element alone would have been
sufficient to find that the taxpayer held more than eighty per cent in value
is not clear from the court's opinion. Apparently, however, the restric-
tions on sale were the most important element, because the effect of such
restrictions on value was more determinable than the control element. In
Revenue Ruling 69-399, "' the Service followed Parker by holding that
a restriction on the sale of twenty per cent of the stock of a corporation
effectively increased the value of eighty per cent of the stock to more
than eighty per cent for purposes of section 1239.
"See United States v. Rothenberg, 350 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1965), in which the Tenth Cir-
cuit followed the Mitchell case.
177361 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1966), rev'g 43 T.C. 127 (1964).
17826 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 632 (1967).
179376 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1967).
"0 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 203.
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It appears that if only the control element is present and the minority
interest is unrestricted, the courts will have a difficult time finding that
such element alone increases the value for purposes of section 1239. Al-
though the control element can determine the course of corporate actions
upon liquidation or merger, it has no more value on a per share basis than
does the minority interest. Of course, such a block of stock could command
a higher price if sold to a third party interested in gaining control of the
corporation, but absent a firm bid which would determine such value, it
would be difficult for a court to "peg" the value of control. If control
alone is sufficient to increase value for purposes of section 1239, application
of that statutory provision would be extremely difficult and taxpayers
owning sufficient stock to constitute control of a corporation would face
unforeseen problems in dealing with such corporations.
If a taxpayer is considering transferring depreciable property to a cor-
poration in exchange for stock and boot, he should carefully consider
taking debt obligations which constitute securities under section 351, in
lieu of the boot. Gain recognized upon redemption of such securities should
be treated as long-term capital gain under section 1232, rather than as
ordinary income under section 1239, which is how such gain would have
been treated had boot been received in the original section 351 transaction.
Other provisions which must be carefully considered include section
617 (relating to recapture of certain mining exploration expenditures),
section 1245 (relating to recapture of depreciation on certain types of
property other than real property), section 1250 (providing for recap-
ture of depreciation on real property), section 1251 (relating to recapture
of certain farm losses), and section 1252 (relating to recapture of certain
expenditures on farm land). Any of these provisions may have the effect
of converting what appears to be capital gain into ordinary income.
C. Allocation of Boot
When more than one item of property is transferred and boot is re-
ceived, a substantial question has existed concerning the determination of
the amount and nature of the gain recognized under section 351(b).
Prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 68-55,181 no specific authority ex-
isted as to the method to be used in allocating boot.8 ' In that ruling, the
IRS took the position that an asset-by-asset approach must be used in de-
termining the amount of gain recognized. The ruling justifies the use of
this approach on the theory that any other treatment would have the
effect of allowing losses that are specifically disallowed by section 351 (b) -
(2).
Under Revenue Ruling 68-55, the total value of the consideration re-
ceived by the transferor is allocated among the transferred assets in pro-
portion to the relative fair market value of such assets. A separate compu-
tation of gain or loss is made with respect to each asset transferred, and
such gain is classified in accordance with the character of the asset. The
1a 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 140.
182 See Rabinovitz, Allocating Boot in Section 3 51 Exchanges, 24 TAx L. REV. 337 (1969).
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boot received is then allocated ratably among the assets transferred in
accordance with the ratio of the value of each asset to the total value of
all assets. After the boot is allocated, the amount of gain with respect to
each asset is recognized to the extent of its allocable share of the boot.
Losses are not allowed. As a result, the total gain recognized is the sum of
the gains recognized on the individual assets without reduction for losses.
The application of Revenue Ruling 68-55 can be illustrated as follows
(assuming that the assets described below are transferred to a corporation




of total Alloca- nized
Fair fair Gain or tion under
Tax market market loss of section
basis value value realized boot 3 51 (b)
Land (capital asset
held more than six
months) $ 50,000 100,000 50.0% $ 50,000 25,000 25,000
Equipment (section 1245
property) 50,000 25,000 12.5% (25,000) 6,250
Inventory (not capital
asset) 50,000 75,000 37.5% 25,000 18,750 18,750
Total $150,000 200,000 100.0% $ 50,000 50,000 43,750
In the above illustration, if the aggregate approach had been used, the
total gain recognized would have been $50,000, rather than $43,750. In
most cases, the asset-by-asset approach of Revenue Ruling 68-55 will pro-
vide the best result for the transferors.
Two important questions are not considered in Revenue Ruling 68-55.
The first relates to treatment of goodwill in situations where boot is re-
ceived, and the second concerns the treatment of specific liens and mort-
gages in the allocation of boot.
Although there is no direct authority on the point, it is generally ac-
cepted that goodwill is property for purposes of section 351." Upon in-
corporation of a going business, goodwill is transferred to the corporation.
Without question, valuation of goodwill is a difficult problem. If such an
asset is present in an incorporation transaction, boot should nevertheless
be allocated thereto. Normally, goodwill will have no tax basis, and
since goodwill is generally a capital asset, any boot which can be allocated
to it will create capital gain income to the transferors.1" Of course, the
corporation will be acquiring a nondepreciable asset.'"
Revenue Ruling 68-55 merely indicates that all consideration received
by the transferors should be allocated among the assets on the basis of
their relative fair market values. Presumably, unsecured liabilities should
be treated in the same manner as any other form of consideration and
Is$ Cf. Rev. Rut. 65-180, 1965.2 CUM. BULL. 279 and Rev. Rut. 64-235, 1964-2 CuM. BULL.
18, relating to treatment of goodwill as property.
'"Ensley Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 154 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1946).
"83See ThriftiCheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961).
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should be allocated among the assets. With respect to specific liens and
mortgages, however, it would seem appropriate to allocate such liabilities
directly to the assets to which they attach. Since the assumption of spe-
cific liens and mortgages is part of the consideration for the assets to which
they attach, it appears logical to reduce the fair market value of such as-
sets by the amount of their liens or mortgages. After making such a re-
duction, the boot would be allocated on the basis of relative fair market
values.'"
Since the IRS has specifically provided a method by which boot is to
be allocated, it is doubtful that an agreement in the exchange contract
setting forth a specific allocation will be recognized. However, if there
is an allocation resulting from valid arm's-length negotiations, it is pos-
sible that such allocation could be recognized."'
D. Boot Versus Dividend
The regulations under section 351 specifically recognize that a distribu-
tion of stock or securities in connection with a section 315 transaction may
have the effect of a distribution of a taxable dividend,'8 s but they do not
elaborate on situations in which such a result might occur. Though the
regulations mention only a distribution of stock or securities in connection
with possible dividend treatment, it is equally possible that a purported
boot distribution might fall in the same category.
Dividend treatment might result from a distribution of securities, and
possibly stock, substantially in excess of the value of the property trans-
ferred to the corporation. This situation appears most likely to occur in
the liquidation-reincorporation area whereby an old corporation is liqui-
dated and its assets are transferred by the shareholders to a new corpora-
tion in exchange for stock and securities. In such a situation, a court would
probably ignore the liquidation and the subsequent reincorporation and
hold that the distribution of securities was a dividend. Such a conclusion
seems to be supported by the regulations under section 301." In any situ-
ation where the consideration paid by the corporation is substantially in
excess of the value of the property transferred, it appears that the IRS
may raise the dividend question.
In one case, Davis v. United States,"" the transferors conveyed property
to a new corporation in exchange for all of its stock. Prior to the incor-
poration, the parties agreed to a value for the property conveyed by one
transferor, and provided that if a subsequent audit reflected a different
value, a cash adjustment would be made. A later audit indicated that the
actual value exceeded the agreed value, and a cash distribution was made to
the transferor in the amount of the excess. The Service contended that the
1"See Treas. Reg. S 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) (1955); id. § 1.334-2, in which specific liens and
mortgages are accorded the treatment suggested in the text.
1s'See Carl L. Danielson, 44 T.C. 549, 556 (196S), for a discussion of the effect of written
documents on allocations by the parties.
'"Treas. Reg. § 1.351-2(d) (1955).
'"2d. § 1.301-1(1).
'90 255 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1958).
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cash payment was a dividend. The Sixth Circuit, however, held that the
distribution was part of the initial transfer and should be taxed as boot
under section 351 (b). In Davis the corporation had substantial earnings
and profits at the time of the cash distribution, but since the delayed dis-
tribution was the result of an arm's-length agreement among the trans-
ferors at the time of incorporation, the court recognized its validity. If
the facts had shown that the agreement was merely a sham to pay the
transferor compensation or a share of the earnings of the corporation, no
doubt the IRS would have been successful.
E. Section 351 Versus Section 304
Section 304 was enacted to ensure that the sale of stock by a shareholder
to a related corporation would be governed by section 302, rather than be
treated as a sale to a third party. In order to avoid dividend treatment on
such a transaction, the seller must be able to meet the test of section 302
relating to stock redemptions. The strength of section 304 was recently
tested against the strength of section 351. Oddly enough, section 351 pre-
vailed.
In Henry McK. Haserot"' an individual owning substantially all of the
stock of three corporations transferred the stock of two to the other in
exchange for additional stock of the transferee corporation, plus cash. The
Tax Court held that section 351 took precedence over section 304 in such
a case, thereby producing capital gain under section 351 (b), rather than
dividend income under sections 304, 302, and 301. The court relied upon
the fact that since both sections 301 (a) and 302 (d) provide that "except
as otherwise provided," Congress intended that section 351 take precedence
in the event of overlapping jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court and remanded the case to determine whether the transaction
was "essentially equivalent to a dividend." Upon remand, the Tax Court
found that the transaction was essentially equivalent to a dividend, but
it remained firm in its conclusion that section 351 prevailed over sections
304, 302, and 301. Surprisingly, upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
It appears that the IRS will have to resort to Congress to resolve this
technical destruction of section 304. Nevertheless, taxpayers should be
wary of relying upon the Haserot decision if they desire sound tax plan-
ning.
F. Boot Versus Loans
Generally, if a short-term note is received as part of the consideration in
a section 351 transaction, it is treated as boot. However the Tax Court,
in two cases, has held that where cash or accounts receivable were loaned
to a corporation in return for a short-term note, the note was not boot.
In Enola C. Hartley. the Tax Court found that a taxpayer had loaned
$100,000 of receivables to a corporation in exchange for a short-term note,
1941 T.C. 562 (1964), rev'd and remanded, 355 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1965), on remand, 46
T.C. 864 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).19' 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem, 186 (1967).
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and held the loan and a section 351 transfer to be separate transactions.
In Sylvan Makover "a the court reached the same conclusion where $130,-
000 ($30,000 in the form of accounts receivable and $100,000 in the form
of cash) was loaned to the corporation. In that case, it was shown that
loans from other sources were available, and based upon this fact, the
court concluded that there had been a loan in exchange for the short-
term note. It is difficult to rationalize the decisions of the Tax Court in
these two cases because of the generally-understood treatment of property
distributed to the transferors as part of a section 351 transaction. If, of
course, the loan transaction can be separated, as it was in Hartley and
Makover, the result can be justified. After considering the number of
cases under section 351 which have combined a multitude of steps to dis-
qualify a section 351 transaction,"" Hartley and Makover must be viewed
as cases which will be relied upon only by the most optimistic taxpayers.
G. Installment Reporting of Boot
There is no authority relating to the reporting of a section 351 trans-
action involving boot on the installment basis under section 453,93 and
at least one commentator has indicated that this method of reporting may
not be available.'" Of course, only on rare occasions will the value of the
stock, which should constitute "other property" under section 453, be
less than thirty per cent of the consideration received in the section 351
transaction. It would seem, however, in cases where the value of the stock
and other property not constituting obligations of the transferee corpora-
tion was less than thirty per cent of the total consideration, and the boot
received was in the form of short-term notes not qualifying as securities,
but qualifying as obligations of the corporation under section 453, that a
taxpayer might attempt to report the collection of the boot on the install-
ment method. 9 ' If securities, as well as short-term notes, were received, it
would seem that the securities should qualify as obligations of the corpora-
tion under section 453, and that they should not be part of the thirty
per cent payment in the year of sale.
If the value of stock and other property not qualifying as obligations of
the corporation exceeded thirty per cent of the total consideration received
by the transferor, the transferee might well argue that the notes, particu-
larly notes of a new corporation, had no readily-ascertainable value. If a
taxpayer could sustain the absence of an ascertainable value, gain would
be reported only if payments were actually made and only after payments,
plus the value of stock and other property received, exceeded the trans-
feror's basis in the property transferred."'
10326 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 288 (1967).
194 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
" INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 453(b), which applies to sales of real property and casual sales
of personalty.
'" Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related Prob-
lens, 16 TAX L. REV. 1, 54 (1960).
'tCf. Rev. Rul. 65-155, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 356, allowing installment reporting for boot re-
ceived in a § 1031 exchange where the requirements of § 453 were met.9
'Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). But cf. Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 CuM. BULL.
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IX. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITIES 9
A. General
Until the Supreme Court announced its decision in United States v.
Hendler"' in 1938, most tax practitioners felt that in an incorporation or
reorganization the assumption of debts by a transferee corporation did
not constitute boot requiring recognition of gain by the transferor or
transferors.0 1 In Hendler, however, the Court held that the assumption
and payment of a transferor's liabilities by a transferee corporation in a
corporate reorganization constituted boot to the transferor. The same
result was reached with respect to the assumption of debt in a tax-free
incorporation under the predecessor of section 351 .'
In the Revenue Act of 1939, Hendler was effectively reversed, and,
subject to certain exceptions, Congress restored the tax-free status of in-
corporations and corporate reorganizations involving the assumption of,
or acquisition of property subject to, the transferor's liabilities..2' Congress
provided, by statutory language now found virtually unchanged in sec-
tion 357(a), that the transferee corporation's assumption of, or taking
property subject to, debt in incorporations and reorganizations would not
be treated as boot to the transferor.
Section 357(a), standing alone, would allow transferors to borrow
against the property immediately prior to the exchange, retain the bor-
rowed funds, and cause the corporation either to assume the liability or
take the property subject to such liability. Although the transferor in
this situation clearly would have received the equivalent of boot, section
357(a) would not require that gain be recognized. In order to prevent
such tax avoidance, what is now section 357(b) was enacted. That pro-
vision requires that if, taking into consideration the nature of the liabili-
ty and the circumstances in the light of which the arrangement for as-
sumption or acquisition was made, it is determined that the principal
purpose of the taxpayer for causing the assumption or acquisition was to
avoid federal income tax, or, if not for such purpose, was not a bona fide
business purpose, then such assumption or acquisition is treated as money
received by the taxpayer in the exchange.
In the 1954 Code, Congress added section 357(c). This new provision
becomes operative if the sum of the amount of liabilities assumed plus
the amount of the liabilities to which the property is subject exceeds the
total of the adjusted tax basis of the property transferred. If such facts
exist, the excess is considered as gain on the sale or exchange of a capital
asset, or property which is not a capital asset, as the case may be. It should
be noted that section 357 (c) is inapplicable if section 357 (b) applies.''
15, which provides that, "except in rare and extraordinary cases," the Internal Revenue Service
will require valuation of contracts and claims.
19 The discussion in this part follows closely Burke & Chisholm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap
in Tax-Free Incorporations, 25 TAx L. REv. 211 (1970), which covers the subject in greater depth.
2'0303 U.S. 564 (1938).
.. See R. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 137 n.420 (3d ser. 1940).
'Walter F. Haass, 37 B.T.A. 948 (1938).
203Int. Rev. Code of 1939, S 112(k).
'"IINT. REV. CODE Of 1954, S 357(c) (2) (A).
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B. Operation of Section 3 57(b)
The general rule of section 357 (a) excludes liabilities from the definition
of boot. That provision does not apply if, after considering the nature of
the liability and the circumstances attendant to its assumption or acqui-
sition, it is determined that the taxpayer's principal purpose is to avoid
federal income tax on the exchange, or is not a bona fide business pur-
pose. °5 If section 357(a) does not apply with respect to any liability as7
sumed by the corporation, section 357 (b) requires that the total amount
of liabilities assumed or acquired pursuant to the exchange be treated as
boot.2
In addition to treating all liabilities as boot, section 357(b) also pro-
vides that in any case where the taxpayer otherwise has the burden of
proof, the burden with respect to proper purpose must be sustained "by
the clear preponderance of the evidence."'207 In fact, the regulations require
the taxpayer to prove his case by such a clear preponderance that the
absence of any improper purpose or the presence of a business purpose is
"unmistakable."'' 8 It is not clear from the statute just whose purpose is in
question under section 357 (b). Although several cases have dealt with the
problem, it has not been completely resolved at this time."9
Only eight cases have been considered by the courts under section
357(b) or its predecessor under the 1939 Code. In the first case con-
sidered under the 1939 Code, Bryan v. Commissioner,"0 the taxpayer had
constructed a number of houses and borrowed funds in excess of the con-
struction costs. While constructing the houses, the taxpayer formed four
new corporations. Upon completion of construction, the houses and land
were transferred to the new corporations, subject to loans, in exchange
for stock. The Fourth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, held that the
excess of the loans over the transferor's basis in the transferred assets was
taxable income on the grounds that the transferor's principal purpose with
respect to the assumption of the loans by the corporations was tax avoid-
ance.
In Easson v. Commissioner.' the taxpayer owned a highly-appreciated
apartment house. The taxpayer borrowed $250,000, encumbering the
apartment house with a mortgage in the same amount. Approximately
four months later, the taxpayer transferred the apartment, subject to the
mortgage, to a new corporation for stock. At the time of transfer, the
mortgage exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the apartment house by approxi-
mately $160,000. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer's desire to re-
tain the proceeds of the mortgage for investment was an adequate busi-
2
05Id. §5357(b) (1) (A), (B).
'OOBy contrast, the 1939 Code stated that in such a case, only the amount of the tainted
liability constituted boot. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(k).
...INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 357(b) (2).
2SOTreas. Reg. § 1.357-1(c) (1955) (last sentence).
' See discussion of this point in Burke & Chisholm, Section 357: A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free
Incorporations, 25 TAx L. REv. 211, 216-17 (1970).
210281 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1960).
21133 T.C. 963 (1960), nonacquiesced in, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 8, aff'd in part and revd in
part, 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
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ness purpose and allowed the corporation to assume the debt. Nevertheless,
the Tax Court was perplexed by the negative basis problem, and, relying
on the tax principle that property cannot have a negative basis, held that
the taxpayer realized gain of $160,000 on the exchange.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument
that a corporate business purpose was required for assumption of the debt.
The Ninth Circuit further held that the desire for liquidity during an
expected business recession was an adequate business purpose under the
predecessor of section 357(b). The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the
Tax Court on its holding that the taxpayer realized a taxable gain. The
reversal was based on the clear language of sections 112 (b) (5) and
112(k) of the 1939 Code that no taxable income resulted from the ex-
change. As a result of the reversal by the Ninth Circuit, the taxpayer
achieved an economic gain of $160,000 without being taxed thereon. It
appears from a careful review of the facts in Easson that both the Tax
Court and the Ninth Circuit should have found that the debt assumption
had as its principal purpose the avoidance of federal income tax.
In Estate of John G. StolW5 a publisher transferred the operating assets
of two newspapers to a new corporation for stock. In addition, the cor-
poration assumed a loan (refinancing earlier loans) received just prior to
incorporation which was secured by mortgages on properties assigned to
the corporation, and a loan secured by life insurance policies which were
not assigned to the corporation. A substantial part of the mortgage loan
was used to discharge the transferor's income tax liabilities for the year of
transfer. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer's principal purpose for
creating the corporation was to preserve the ownership of his newspapers.
The court found that no tax avoidance motive was present with respect
to the assumption of either loan, and that there was a valid business pur-
pose for the assumption of the mortgage loan. However, the taxpayer
could not support the assumption of the loan secured by insurance poli-
cies with a bona fide business purpose. Presumably, the fact that the
insurance policies were not assigned to the corporation was the determining
factor in the Tax Court's view.
In Jewell v. United States' the taxpayer purchased stock of a corpo-
ration, giving a promissory note for the balance of the purchase price. The
taxpayer and the holder of the remaining stock liquidated the corporation
and distributed its assets in proportion to their stock holdings. The assets
were immediately transferred to a partnership, and the taxpayer's promis-
sory note was recorded on the books of the partnership as a liability. Ap-
proximately six months later, the partnership was dissolved. On the fol-
lowing day, the taxpayer formed a corporation and transferred his share
of the partnership assets to it. The new corporation assumed the promis-
sory note and thereafter executed its own note to the original seller of the
212 38 T.C. 223 (1962), acquiesced in on another issue and not acquiesced in on this issue,
1967-1 CuM. BULL. 3. The acquiescence relates to the Tax Court's summary finding that there
was a valid assumption of debt so that the subsequent principal and interest payments made by
the corporation did not constitute dividends to the transferor.
'59330 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'g 217 F. Supp. 572 (D. Idaho 1963).
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stock, thereby cancelling the taxpayer's note which it had assumed. The
corporation subsequently paid the new note. The Ninth Circuit, reversing
the district court, held that payment of the note was not a constructive
dividend to the taxpayer. The court then determined that avoidance of
personal liability, and not avoidance of federal income tax, was the tax-
payer's principal purpose for having the note assumed by the corporation.
The court further held that since the debt assumption made good business
sense, there was a bona fide business purpose for the assumption.
The first case decided under section 357(b) of the 1954 Code was
Campbell v. Wheeler.14 There, the taxpayer owned a small interest in a
partnership. He assigned one-third of the interest and a three per cent
interest in an existing corporation to a new corporation, subject to a loan
incurred to pay his personal income tax on his share of partnership profits.
The Fifth Circuit held that the taxpayer did not sustain his burden of
proving, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that there was a valid
business purpose for the assumption of the loan." ' The court indicated that
the payment of personal income tax, even if resulting from participation
in a business enterprise, was a purely personal obligation.
In the first case considered by the Tax Court under section 357(b) of
the 1954 Code, W. H. B. Simpson,"' the taxpayer transferred to a corpo-
ration assets which were subject to liabilities totaling slightly less than the
tax basis of the property transferred. The liabilities were not incurred im-
mediately prior to the transfer, but were incurred over a period of time in
connection with business operations. The Tax Court found that the tax-
payer sustained his burden of proof under section 357 (b).
In the most recent case under section 357(b), Drybrough v. Commis-
sioner,1' the taxpayer transferred real estate, subject to liabilities, to five
new corporations. The mortgage assumed by four of the corporations had
been incurred several years prior to the exchange. The fifth corporation,
however, assumed a mortgage incurred shortly before the transfer. The
proceeds of such mortgage were invested in tax-exempt securities. The
Sixth Circuit, on the basis of the Simpson case, found that the purpose
to avoid income tax under section 357 (b) was narrowed to a purpose with
respect to the assumption on the exchange. Therefore, the court found it
unnecessary to trace the use of the proceeds from the mortgage incurred
in prior years. The court did find, however, that with respect to the loan
assumed by the fifth corporation, the taxpayer failed to prove that his
purpose was not avoidance of income tax.
It appears on the basis of the decided cases that the "avoidance of in-
come tax" clause of section 357(b) has been limited significantly, and as
long as the debt is not incurred as part of the plan under section 351, the
courts probably will not find tax avoidance as a purpose. The business
purpose clause has not been as effective as it should have been, presumably
21 342 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1965).
15 See also Thompson v. Campbell, 353 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1965).
2 143 T.C. 900 (1965), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 6.
376 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967).
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because a finding that business purpose is not present with respect to one
liability causes all liabilities assumed to be treated as boot."'s Because of this
rule, the implications of section 357(b) can be disastrous. For example,
if a taxpayer causes a new corporation to assume a $100,000 mortgage on
property transferred, and also causes it to assume a $100 personal liability
for which there is no business purpose, the entire $100,100 would be
treated as boot under section 357(b). No doubt section 357(b) would be
more effective if only the tainted liability were treated as boot. 1'
C. Operation of Section 357(c)
Under section 357(c), a transferor recognizes gain in an amount equal
to the excess of the sum of (1) his liabilities assumed by the corporation,
and (2) liabilities to which the property transferred is subject, over the
adjusted basis of the property transferred to the corporation."' Each trans-
feror's gain is determined separately by comparing the liabilities of that
transferor assumed by the corporation with the total tax basis of the
property transferred by such transferor."
With respect to determining the amount of liabilities assumed, the Tax
Court held in Arthur L. Kniffen... that if the transferor is indebted to the
transferee corporation, and the transferee corporation assumes that debt
and subsequently extinguishes it, such indebtedness is deemed to have been
assumed by the transferee for purposes of section 357. The Kniff en case
involved a situation in which an individual transferred all of the assets
and liabilities of his sole proprietorship to a controlled corporation. One of
the liabilities assumed was a debt owed by the sole proprietorship to the
corporation. The Commissioner argued that discharge of the indebtedness
was boot under section 351 (b). The Tax Court held that section 357 was
concerned only with the assumption of the transferor's liabilities, and not
with the subsequent extinguishment. Therefore, the debt to the corpora-
tion was held to have been assumed for purposes of section 357, and did
not constitute boot.
One device which has been suggested to avoid the application of sec-
tion 357 (c) is the execution of a note by the transferor to the transferee
corporation in an amount equal to the excess of liabilities assumed by the
transferee corporation over the transferor's total tax basis in the transferred
property. The IRS has ruled that this procedure does not avoid section
357(c), since the taxpayer has no cost basis in the note under section
1012." Hence, the transfer of such a note to the corporation does not
serve to increase the total tax basis of the transferred assets.""
"a See BITTKER & EusTicE 82-83 n.26.
219 Re-enactment of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(k), would effectively achieve this result.
2 9See DeFelice v. Commissioner, 386 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1967); Testor v. Commissioner,
327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
221Rev. Rul. 66-142, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 66.
222 39 T.C. 5M3 (1962), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 5.
22 2Rev. Rul. 68-629, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 154.
224As an alternative, a taxpayer might borrow money, transfer the borrowed funds to the
corporation, and retain and pay the debt personally. In today's money market, few transferors
will find this alternative desirable.
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Section 357 (c) makes incorporation of a cash-basis taxpayer extremely
delicate. In Peter Raich 2 a cash-basis transferor incorporated a proprietor-
ship which had assets of $88,613, including $77,361 of unrealized receiv-
ables and liabilities of $45,992, including $37,719 of unpaid cash-basis
payables. The Tax Court held that since the basis of the unrealized re-
ceivables was zero, the taxpayer realized gain on the transfer equal to the
difference between the liabilities assumed and the taxpayer's basis in the
other property transferred. Therefore, cash-basis taxpayers should be ex-
tremely careful in determining the amount of basis being transferred and
the amount of liabilities being assumed in order to avoid the problem of
the Raich case.
If gain is recognized under section 357 (c), such gain must be reported
as ordinary income, long-term capital gain, or short-term capital gain
according to the nature of the transferred property, and the regulations
require that the total gain be allocated among the assets on the basis of
their relative fair market values. " Further, special provisions, such as sec-
tions 617, 1239, 1245, 1250, 1251, and 1252, cause gain allocated to as-
sets subject to those provisions to be ordinary income, rather than capital
gain income. This method of allocating gain can easily distort the nature
of gain recognized by the transferor. For example, assume a taxpayer
transfers accounts receivable having a basis and a fair market value of
$20,000 and investment land having a basis of $5,000 and a fair market
value of $80,000 to a corporation in exchange for stock and the as-
sumption of liabilities in the amount of $100,000. Under section 357(c),
the taxpayer would recognize gain of $75,000 ($100,000 of liabilities as-
sumed less basis in accounts receivable of $20,000 and basis in land of
$5,000). Under the allocation method described above, $15,000 of the
gain would be allocated to accounts receivable (twenty per cent of $75,-
000), and, hence, would be ordinary income, and $60,000 would be al-
located to the land (eighty per cent of $75,000), and, hence, would be
capital gain income. Clearly the entire gain is attributable to the land and
should be taxed accordingly. The requirement that gain under section
357(c) be recognized based on the relative fair market values of the as-
sets transferred to the corporation directly conflicts with the more realis-
tic method adopted under section 351 (b)... and should be corrected.
X. BASIS AND HOLDING PERIOD OF TRANSFEROR
A. General
As is the general rule with all nonrecognition provisions," under section
3 51, the transferor's basis in the property surrendered is preserved and be-
comes the basis in the property received in the exchange. This rule is ap-
plied to section 3 51 transactions by virtue of section 3 5 8. With respect to
2246 T.C. 604 (1966), appeal dismissed (9th Cir. 1968). See also Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2
CUM. BULL. 53.
226Treas. Reg. S 1.357-2 (1955).
227 Rev. Rul. 68-55, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 140.
228 C. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1031.
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the holding period of the stock or securities received, in most cases section
1223 (1) will cause the holding period for such stock or securities to in-
clude the period during which the transferred property was held by the
transferor, provided such property was either a capital asset or a section
1231 (b) asset in the hands of the transferor. These general rules become
somewhat more difficult to apply when the transferor receives boot in the
incorporation transaction, or when mixed property is transferred to the
corporation.
B. Basis Determination-No Boot
When the transferor receives only stock or securities in the section
3 5 1 transaction, the total basis of all such stock or securities is the same as
the basis of the property transferred."9 If more than one class of stock is
received or if both stock and securities are received, the basis of the prop-
erty transferred is allocated among the stock and securities in proportion
to the fair market values of each class of stock and each class of securi-
ties."' There is authority for the proposition that where the fair market
values of two classes of stock are not ascertainable, the transferor is en-
titled to recover his entire basis before recognizing gain."' No part of the
basis is required to be allocated to the class of stock retained.
Where the transferor conveys only one asset to the corporation and re-
ceives only a single class of stock or securities in return, no problem arises
with the basis allocation provision. In addition, if the transferor conveys
only one asset to the corporation and receives in return more than one
class of stock or stock and securities, it appears logical to allocate the trans-
feror's basis in such asset among the stock and/or securities received on
the basis of their relative fair market values.
If more than one asset is transferred by a transferor to a corporation,
the basis allocation outlined above may not be proper. For example, if a
transferor receives 100 shares of stock in exchange for two assets, one
having basis of $1,000 and value of $2,000 and the other having basis
and value of $2,000, it would seem permissible for the transferor to desig-
nate that fifty shares had been received for the asset having a basis of
$1,000, and that the remaining fifty shares had been received for the
asset having a basis of $2,000. Under the general rule of section 358,
however, it would appear that the basis would be allocated equally among
the 100 shares received.
The specific identification theory would seem justified because it merely
allows the transferor to have some control over his subsequent gain or
loss on the sale of stock, just as he would have had control over such gain
or loss had he retained the assets and sold them. If, however, all the shares
have the same basis, he has lost control of gain or loss on subsequent sales
of stock. On the other hand, if the taxpayer has an asset which has de-
preciated in value and which is essential to the business, and therefore
..Id. S 358(a)(1).
"oTreas. Reg. 5 1.358-2(b)(2) (1955).
..
t Edwin D. Axton, 32 B.T.A. 613 (1935), acquiesced in, 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
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could not be sold, he might use this approach to realize the loss by selling
the stock to which he allocated the high basis. Of course, a sale of the en-
tire block of stock at one time would make specific identification mean-
ingless. The cases in which the use of specific identification has been urged
have generally adhered to the average basis theory suggested by the regu-
lations. 2' There are, however, two cases in the reorganization area which
permit specific identification by matching particular shares received with
particular shares transferred." The theory of these cases has never been
applied to section 351. It is suggested that the specific identification rule
should be permissible under section 351, provided the allocation is made
by the taxpayer at the time the section 351 transaction occurs. Perhaps
the allocation should be an election allowed the taxpayer at the time of in-
corporation. Certainly, the rule should not be so flexible that the taxpayer
could choose his method of allocation after he has decided to sell part of
the stock or securities received in the section 351 transaction.
If the transferee corporation assumes a liability of the transferor or
acquires property from such transferor subject to a liability, the amount of
the liability, for purposes of determining basis, is treated as money re-
ceived by the transferor in exchange. This reduction in basis is required
whether or not the recognition of gain is required under section 357.Y
C. Basis Determination-Boot Received
Section 358 also applies to determine basis when a transferor receives
boot in a section 351 transaction. Section 358 (a) (2) provides that boot,
other than money, receives a basis equal to its fair market value, and sec-
tion 358 (a) (1) provides that the stock or securities received have the
same basis as the basis of the property given up, reduced by the amount
of money and the fair market value of the boot received and increased by
the gain recognized on the exchange.
The provisions of section 358 (a) can be illustrated if it is assumed that
a transferor conveys property having an adjusted basis of $80,000 in ex-
change for stock and bonds worth $160,000, cash in the amount of $30,-
000, and other property valued at $10,000. The transferor would realize
a gain of $120,000 (value of stock, bonds, cash, and other property re-
ceived of $200,000 minus basis in property transferred of $80,000), and
such gain would be recognized under section 351 (b) to the extent of the
boot received, or $40,000. The transferor would receive a basis in the
other property equal to its fair market value of $10,000, and the basis
.. See Commissioner v. Bolender, 82 F.2d 591 (7th Cir. 1936); Commissioner v. Von Gunten,
76 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1935); P.L. Wheeler, 32 B.T.A. 917 (1935); cf. Nassau Lens Co., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962), implying this result under § 351.
"3'See Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964); Bloch v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1945).
234f the transferor remains personally liable and subsequently is required to pay the debt,
such payment probably constitutes additional basis in the stock or securities received in the §
351 transfer, although the taxpayer could argue that such payment constituted a deductible loss.
If the stock or securities have been sold when the payment is made, presumably the loss deduction
would have the same character as the gain or loss on the sale of the stock or securities under the
doctrine of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
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of the stocks and bonds would be $80,000 (basis of property transferred of
$80,000, less cash received of $30,000 and value of other property re-
ceived of $10,000, plus gain recognized of $40,000). Such resulting basis
would be allocated between the stock and bonds in proportion to their
respective values unless specific identification could be sustained.
D. Holding Period of Transferor
As a general rule, a transferor under section 351 determines the holding
period of the stock or securities received by including the period during
which he held the transferred property, provided such property was either
a capital asset or a section 1231 (b) asset in his hands. The holding period
of stock or securities in exchange for property which does not so qualify
begins on the date of the section 351 transaction.
If both capital assets (and/or section 1231 assets) and non-capital as-
sets are transferred, it appears that an allocation of holding period is neces-
sary. There is no definitive rule as to whether some of the stock or securi-
ties received will have a holding period beginning on the date of the sec-
tion 351 transaction, while the balance will have longer holding periods,
or whether the holding period for each share of stock or for each security
will be divided. The same problem could result, of course, where several
capital or section 1231 assets with different holding periods to the trans-
feror were transferred to a corporation under section 351. There is a de-
cision, involving the sale of all the stock received in a section 351 trans-
action, which indicates that if the entire block of stock or securities re-
ceived is sold, the holding period allocation is made by reference to the
basis of the assets transferred." Such a result does not seem proper, since
the basis of an asset transferred under section 351 generally bears little re-
lationship to its fair market value and, hence, to its contribution to the
gain or loss recognized on the subsequent sale.
If boot is received in a section 351 transaction, the holding period of
the boot does not include the period for which the transferred property
was held, since section 1223 (1) allows "tacking" only if the property re-
ceived has the same basis "in whole or in part" as the property exchanged.
Since the basis of boot is its fair market value at the time of the section
351 transaction and bears no relationship whatsoever to the basis of the
property transferred, there is no "tacking" of the holding period.
The applicability of section 1223 (1) to stock or securities received in a
section 351 transaction in which boot is also received is not entirely clear.
As discussed above, the basis of such stock or securities is the same as the
property transferred, decreased by the fair market value of the boot and
increased by the amount of gain recognized. It would seem logical that
section 1223 (1) would apply and "tack" the holding period of transferred
properties to the stock or securities, since the basis of such stock or se-
curities is "in part" determined by the basis of the property transferred.
"Harry M. Runkle, 39 B.T.A. 458 (1939).
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XI. BASIS AND HOLDING PERIOD OF TRANSFEREE CORPORATION
A. Basis Determination
Under section 362 (a), the transferee corporation receives a basis in
property transferred in a section 351 transaction equal to the transferor's
basis, increased by the amount of gain recognized by the transferor in ex-
change. Therefore, if the exchange is tax free, each asset retains the same
basis that it had to the transferor before exchange.'
In a section 351 transaction in which boot is received, the basis of the
transferee corporation in the assets received is increased by the amount of
gain recognized by the transferor. No authority exists, however, for al-
locating the increase among the various items. Presumably, the rule of
Revenue Ruling 68-55,3 ' relating to allocation of boot for determination
of gain, should also apply to determination of basis of the transferee cor-
poration. Hence, boot should be allocated ratably among the various items
in accordance with their fair market values.
B. Holding Period of Transferee Corporation
Under section 1223 (2), the holding period of the transferee corporation
includes the period during which property received in the section 351
transaction was held by the transferor, regardless of the character of the
asset received. Presumably "tacking" of a holding period would be per-
mitted to the transferee corporation even though the transferor received
boot in the transaction, since section 1223 permits "tacking" where the
transferee corporation's basis is the same "in whole or in part" as the trans-
feror's basis. Since, under section 362, the basis of all property is deter-
mined "in part" by reference to the basis of the transferor, section 1223 (2)
should apply.
XII. PROBLEMS OF ALLOCATING INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. General
As stated above, the legislative purpose for section 351 is to provide
insulation against recognition of gain upon a mere change in form of
ownership. Generally, this intent is accomplished by the deferral of gain
on the transfer of appreciated assets until such time as the stock or securi-
ties received in the exchange are sold. Significant problems may arise, how-
ever, in determining the effect of section 351 on the taxation of income
and expense items transferred to a corporation.
B.. Transfers of Unrealized Receivables
It is not clear from the legislative history what.effect Congress intended
section 3 51 to have on the transfer of property representing income earned
by the predecessor, such as cash basis accounts receivable, which will be
realized and taxed to the transferee corporation. The courts, when faced
236 See P.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940).
271968-1 CUM. BULL. 140.
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with the question, have generally allowed the transfer to qualify under
section 351 and the income to be taxed to the corporation. In Thomas W.
Briggs... the taxpayer transferred unrealized, cash-basis receivables to a
corporation under section 351. The Commissioner argued that either such
transfer constituted an assignment of income, or the predecessors of sec-
tions 446(b) and 482 applied and the receivables should be taxed to the
transferor. The court summarily disposed of this issue and held that sec-
tion 351 provided nonrecognition to the transferor. The Briggs case, how-
ever, does not resolve the question whether section 351 overrides the well-
established judicial principle of assignment of income and the provisions of
sections 446(b) and 482.23 Obviously, many income rights constitute
property which can be transferred under section 351, although the sub-
sequent collection of the income may not be properly taxed to the trans-
feree corporation. For example, in H. B. Zachry Co."' the Tax Court held
that the carved-out oil payment, representing a "pure income" right, was
property which could be transferred to the corporation under section 351,
although the court properly left open the question as to whom such in-
come would be taxed.' 1
A proper analysis of the question requires that a court first recognize
that a right to receive income may be property' and therefore no taxable
event occurs at the moment of the transfer of such property right under
section 351. If the income right is found to be property, then the questions
to be resolved are whether the income resulting from such property right
should be taxed to the transferor or the transferee corporation, and when
such taxation should occur. As indicated in Briggs, the IRS may attempt to
apply both the assignment-of-income doctrine and clear-reflection-of-in-
come doctrine to tax the transferor on unrealized income transferred to a
corporation under section 351.
C. Assignment-of-Income Doctrine
The assignment-of-income doctrine is well entrenched in the tax law.'
Generally, the doctrine is applied either where a taxpayer earns income by
performing services and assigns the right to such income to a third party
prior to collection, or where a taxpayer has a right to receive income from
property and assigns such right while retaining the underlying property.
The IRS has been successful in applying the assignment-of-income doctrine
to overcome section 3 51 in only one case. In Brown v. Commissioner'" a
lawyer who had rendered legal services transferred his right to the fee from
23815 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 440 (1956).
239See also P.A. Birren & Son v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940); Arthur L.
Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CuM. BULL. 5. Both these cases also seem to
accept the principle that income can be effectively transferred from one taxpayer to another by
assigning unrealized receivables to a corporation under § 351.
24049 T.C. 73 (1967).
24149 T.C. at 80 n.5.
141 For an example of a situation in which this step was not applied properly in a situation
analogous to a § 351 transfer, see Tatum v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1968).
24 See Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940);
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
244115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940).
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such services to his wholly-owned corporation prior to collection of the
fee. The fee claim was the corporation's only asset. The taxpayer argued
that he should realize no income from collection of the receivable under
the predecessor of section 3 51. The Second Circuit concluded that although
no gain was realized on the exchange for stock under the predecessor of
section 351, the taxpayer was nevertheless taxable on the income from the
receivable when collected by the corporation. It is indeed difficult to recon-
cile the result of Brown with the result of Briggs. It must be concluded
that the Briggs decision, which involved the transfer of a going business
into a new corporation, is founded upon the assumption that the assign-
ment of accounts receivable in that case was an integral part of a valid busi-
ness transaction and did not have as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of tax. In Brown the transfer was obviously to avoid tax. Never-
theless, if the assignment-of-income doctrine is a valid tax principle, it
appears that it might well be applied in all cases, regardless of intent.
The application of the assignment-of-income doctrine to unrealized in-
come rights transferred under section 351 can be extremely burdensome
and, in fact, disastrous to the transferor. The income would not be taxed to
the transferor until collected or received by the transferee corporation.
The proceeds of the income are, at that point, corporate property. By the
time the IRS is successful in applying the assignment-of-income doctrine,
whether by administrative or judicial proceedings, the corporation may
have substantial earnings and profits, and withdrawal of funds to pay the
tax on the assigned income would be taxed as a dividend. Such a result,
of course, is untenable.' Therefore, in the section 351 area, the assign-
ment-of-income doctrine is not a satisfactory solution, at least from the
transferor's standpoint. Furthermore, the doctrine is not consistent with
the purpose of section 351, which is to facilitate incorporations without
uncertainty.
D. Clear-Reflection-of-Income Doctrine
Both sections 446(b) and 482 embody the clear-reflection-of-income
doctrine and may be used to tax the transferor on the unrealized income.
Under section 446(b), the Service can require use of a method of ac-
counting which clearly reflects income. Thus, the transferor could be re-
quired to report income up to the date of transfer on the accrual method
or percentage-of-completion method, even though the cash method or
completed contract method had been used for operations prior to that
time. In Palmer v. Commissioner" the predecessor of section 446(b) was
' If it appears that the assignment-of-income doctrine might apply, it may be advisable for
the predecessor entity to withhold sufficient liquid assets so that any future tax asserted under
the assignment-of-income doctrine could be paid. In the alternative, the incorporation agreement
could require that the corporation remit collections of accounts receivable to the predecessor to
the extent the Internal Revenue Service held such receivables taxable to the predecessor. Such a
pre-existing agreement would at least offer some basis for arguing that the post-incorporation re-
mittances should not be treated as dividends to the predecessor. See Vincent E. Oswald, 49 T.C.
645 (1968), acquiesced in, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 2, where a similar agreement was upheld with
respect to excessive compensation.
2"267 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 821 (1960).
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applied to require a taxpayer who had been reporting on the completed
contract method to report income earned to the date of incorporation on
the percentage-of-completion method. Although in many cases a change in
method of accounting will not tax income to the transferor (e.g., transfer
of growing crops before sale and after the expense of raising are incurred,
or transfer of depreciated property for sale by the corporation), section
446(b) appears to be the proper tool for taxing transfers of unrealized,
cash-basis receivables. Under that provision, all uncollected income and
unpaid expenses could be accrued on the date of transfer and taxed at
that point." Presumably, the corporation could assume the resulting tax
liability and pay such liability from the collection proceeds of the accrued
receivables.""
If section 446(b) does not provide an effective remedy, section 482
could be applied. In National Securities Corp. v. Commissioner"" the pre-
decessor of section 482 was applied to re-allocate a loss on the sale of se-
curities from a subsidiary corporation to the parent since the depreciation
in value had occurred during the period in which the parent corporation
owned the securities. The Third Circuit found that section 482 took pri-
ority over section 351 in that case. In Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Commis-
sioner"° expenses of raising a crop were allocated from the transferor to
the transferee corporation, which realized the income from the crop."'s
Section 482, like the assignment-of-income doctrine, could create prob-
lems for the transferor if income were allocated to him after the proceeds
had become corporate property. It is submitted, however, that section
482 is a policing provision, much like the assignment-of-income doctrine,
and should be used only when there is abuse of section 351. Therefore, a
taxpayer abusing section 3 51 must take the attendant risk that repatriation
of funds to pay the tax he attempted to avoid may be taxable as a divi-
dend and, hence, make his adventure more costly than if he had not at-
tempted to avoid tax.
E. Assumption of Unpaid Expenses
Invariably, upon incorporation, liabilities, whether known or unknown,
will exist with respect to the predecessor entity. Of course, if the amount
of liability is ascertainable and the predecessor used the accrual method of
accounting, the deduction for such items will already have been accrued
"7 It would appear inappropriate to accrue income which otherwise could be reported on the
installment method under § 453, since the Internal Revenue Service by its own regulations permits
the transfer of installment obligations without "triggering" the unrealized income attributable
thereto. See Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c) (2) (1958).
."Assumption of a liability for federal income tax for a predecessor may give rise to problems
under § 357(b). In Estate of John G. Stoll, 38 T.C. 223 (1962), the Tax Court did not apply
5 357(b) to the assumption of a debt incurred to pay personal income taxes, but in Campbell
V. Wheeler, 342 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1965), the court found that a loan to pay personal income
taxes arising from operations other than those transferred to the corporation did come within the
purview of S 357(b) for lack of business purpose. See generally Burke & Chisholm, Section 357:
A Hidden Trap in Tax-Free Incorporations, 25 TAx L. REv. 211, 224-26 (1970).
249 137 F.2d 600 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943).
250198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952).
"'See also Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962), reaching the same result.
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for federal income tax purposes. If, however, the predecessor used the cash
method of accounting or if the liabilities are not ascertainable in amount
by an accrual basis predecessor, the deduction for such items will not have
been taken at the date of incorporation.
If the predecessor retains such liabilities, it should be entitled to deduct
those liabilities when paid or incurred (depending upon its method of
accounting) ." Many times, all liabilities of the predecessor are transferred
to the transferee corporation. Substantial authority exists that the trans-
feree corporation will not be entitled to a deduction upon payment of the
liabilities." The assumption of an otherwise deductible liability is general-
ly regarded as a capital expenditure incurred in acquiring the business.
The predecessor may be allowed a deduction even if the corporation as-
sumes the liability, if the predecessor can establish that a portion of the
assets were transferred to the corporation to pay the assumed liability."
When liabilities are to be assumed by the transferee corporation, it is sug-
gested that a list of such liabilities and a list of the assets transferred for
payment of such liabilities be included as part of the incorporation agree-
ment.
In the event there is a contingent or contested liability, it is suggested
that the predecessor retain and pay that liability even if it requires that
some liquid assets be retained for such payment, if such liability will give
rise to a deduction for federal income tax purposes.
F. Ruling Policy of the Internal Revenue Service
The private ruling policy of the IRS with respect to cash-basis tax-
payers has changed several times in recent years. It is understood at the
present time that the Service will issue a favorable ruling under section
351 on the incorporation of a cash-basis taxpayer if the transferee corpora-
tion will enter into a closing agreement by which it agrees to include the
receivables in its taxable income upon collection, and in which the IRS
agrees that the transferee corporation will be entitled to a deduction for
the payables upon their payment. This ruling policy, of course, does not
completely clear the Raich problem, because section 357 (c) will continue
to apply where liabilities exceed basis upon the transfer. The Service will
not rule that a transferor may transfer receivables to a corporation and
retain the payables, since such a procedure fails to result in a proper match-
ing of income and deductions. It is understood, however, that the Service
will rule favorably where payables are retained if an equal amount of ac-
counts receivable are retained.
G. Recovery of Prior Deductions
Normally, a transferor is not required to recover prior deductions upon
transfer of assets to a corporation under section 3 51. Special exception pro-
visions throughout the Code preclude the recapture of depreciation and
'2 See Rev. Rul. 67-12, 1967-1 Cu M. BULL. 29.
23 See note 67 supra.
" Cf. Pierce Oil Corp. v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Va. 1947).
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certain other special deductions which must be recaptured in taxable trans-
actions." Hence, the recapture provisions of the Code do not generally
create a problem under section 3 51, unless a portion of the transaction is
taxable because of the receipt of boot. In the past, however, transferors
have occasionally encountered problems with respect to the treatment of
reserves for bad debts upon incorporation of a predecessor business.
In Revenue Ruling 62-128 ," the Service took the position that if a
sole proprietor transferred a business under section 351, such proprietor
was required to take his bad debt reserve (if any) into income to the ex-
tent that additions to such reserve had been deducted in prior years with
a tax benefit. In Nash v. United States"' the Fifth Circuit followed the
theory of Revenue Ruling 62-128 and held that a partnership which used
the reserve method of accounting for bad debts had to include the bad
debt reserve in income when it transferred its assets, including accounts
receivable, to controlled corporations in exchange for stock. This result
directly conflicted with the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Estate of
Schmidt v. Commissioner," in which it was held that although the need
for the reserve ended with the transfer, the end to such need did not make
necessary the inclusion of the reserve in income. In order to resolve the
conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, certiorari was granted by
the Supreme Court in the Nash case."' Before the Supreme Court, the
IRS based its argument in Nash on the so-called tax benefit rule, under
which recovery of an item that has produced an income tax benefit in
a prior year is to be added to income in the year of recovery. It was argued
that this rule applied in the Nash case because the unused portion of a
bad debt reserve must be restored to income when the reserve is no longer
necessary, such as when a business is terminated by transfer of its assets
to a new corporation. The Supreme Court was not willing to make "end
of need" synonymous with "recovery," as the latter term is used in the
tax benefit rule. The Court found that the transferors in Nash received
stock equal in value to the net value of the receivables."' Hence, there
was no recovery of the unused reserve when the receivables were trans-
ferred at net value. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Nash case
is obviously a proper one, since accounts receivable do not increase in
value to their face amount merely because they are transferred to a
corporation.
Another problem which might arise with respect to prior deductions is
the applicability of section 111 to the transferee corporation in the event it
recovers prior deductions which did not result in a reduction of income
tax to the transferor when incurred. Section 111 provides for the ex-
clusion from income of recoveries of previously-deducted bad debts, taxes,
'MINT. REV. CODE of 1954, %5 617(d) (3), 1245(b) (3), 1250(d) (3), 1251 (d) (3), 1252(b).
2' 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 139. See generally Note, A Misunderstanding of the Function of a Bad
Debt Reserve When Incorporating Under Section 351, 24 Sw. L.J. 372 (1970).
27414 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1969).
258355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966).
"9396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
20398 U.S. 1 (1970).
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and tax penalties, if the deduction did not result in a reduction of income
tax in a prior year. Presumably, however, this privilege is not assignable
by the transferor to the transferee. Hence if a transferee corporation re-
covers a bad debt which was previously written off by a predecessor entity,
but which resulted in no tax benefit to such entity, such recovery would
be taxable to the transferee corporation and not excludable under section
111. In planning an incorporation, therefore, if significant bad debts,
taxes, or tax penalties which qualify for section 111 treatment have been
deducted by the transferor, such transferor should retain the right to such
items in the event of recovery.
H. Recapture of Investment Credit
Although the investment credit is now, for the most part, a dead issue,
credits used in the past, or those used in the future as allowed by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, may create tax liability upon incorporation."' The
tax liability for recapture of investment credit may result whether or not
boot is received in the transaction.
Ordinarily, the transfer of a going business under section 351 will not
give rise to recapture as long as: (1) the section 351 transaction is a mere
change in the form of conducting the trade or business; (2) the property
is retained in such trade or business as section 38 property; and (3) the
taxpayer retains a substantial interest in such trade or business."' The regu-
lations state that a transferor will be considered as having retained a sub-
stantial interest in the trade or business only if, after the change in form,
his interest is substantial in relation to the total interest of all persons or
is equal to or greater than his interest prior to the change in form.' This
rule was tested before the Tax Court in James Soares."6 4 In that case, the
court held that a disposition occurred for purposes of section 47 (a) where
upon incorporation of a partnership in which the taxpayer held a forty-
eight per cent interest, such taxpayer received only a 7.2 per cent interest
in the new corporation. Even if a taxpayer avoids recapture on a transfer
to a corporation, such transferor may be charged with recapture of in-
vestment credit in the event the transferee disposes of the property before
the close of its estimated useful life, or if such transferor subsequently does
not retain a substantial interest in the business."'
XIII. EFFECT OF REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS ON SECTION 3 51
A. Business Purpose Doctrine
The regulations under section 368 relating to tax-free reorganizations
provide that a "scheme" whereby the reorganization procedures are used
merely to avoid tax and "no business or corporate purpose" exists will not
be treated as a tax-free reorganization.' Such language, of course, is based
wt See generally INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 49.
263 Id. S 47(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3(f) (1) (ii) (1967).
'6 Treas. Reg. § 1.47-3 (f) (2) (1967).
21 S T.C. 909 (1968).




upon the business purpose doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering. The regula-
tions under section 3 51 do not require a business purpose for a transfer to
a controlled corporation. Further, the legislative history of section 3 51 is
silent on the point. Nevertheless, the courts and the IRS have, from time
to time, applied the business purpose doctrine to cause a section 351 trans-
action to fail.
In West Coast Marketing Corp." the Tax Court indicated that the busi-
ness purpose doctrine applied in a situation where the existence of the
transferee corporation was transitory. "' In a much earlier case, however,
the Board of Tax Appeals rejected application of the business purpose
doctrine. In W. & K. Holding Corp."" the controlling shareholders of a
corporation transferred property which had depreciated in value to the
corporation in exchange for additional stock. The property was sold by
the corporation shortly after the exchange and it claimed a loss on the sale.
The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Commissioner's claim that the
transfer had no business purpose, and allowed the loss to the corporation.
It is interesting to note that the predecessor of section 482 was not ap-
plied in W. & K. Holding Corp.
In Revenue Ruling 55-36,' 7° the IRS imposed the business purpose re-
quirement on a section 351 transaction in which an individual transferred
stock to a new corporation in exchange for all of its stocks and bonds. The
transferor immediately transferred the stock of the new corporation to a
charity which, in turn, caused the new corporation to liquidate. The char-
ity assumed the corporation's bond obligations. The individual planned to
make subsequent periodic gifts of the bonds to the charity, thereby spread-
ing his charitable deduction over a number of years. The IRS noted that the
new corporation did not remain in existence after the transaction, and
concluded that there was no business purpose for the transfer. Therefore,
section 3 51 was held not to apply. The ruling also stated that the transferor
was not in control of the new corporation, since his ownership of its stock
was only transitory. It appears that this ground alone would have been
sufficient to conclude that section 351 did not apply. However, it appears
that the principal reason for the holding was the lack of business purpose.
In Revenue Ruling 60-331,7' certain transferors transferred stock of a
corporation to a second corporation shortly before a dividend was to be
paid on such stock. The sole purpose of the transfer was to qualify the
dividend for the dividend-received deduction under section 243. Because
of the absence of business purpose, the transfer was held to be ineffective,
and the dividend was taxed to the transferors. It appears that the-same re-
sult might have been obtained by applying section 482. Under Revenue
Procedure 70-17,22 the-IRS requires that the business reasons for a section
351 transaction be explained if an advance ruling is being requested. In
2746 T.C. 32 (1966).
"See also Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937).
2'938 B.T.A. 830 (1938).
2701955-1 CUM. BULL. 340.
271 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 189.
272 1970 ITNT. REv. BULL. No. 27, at 40, §§ 3.06(1), (2).
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addition, the future activities of the transferee corporation must be de-
scribed.
In Gregory v. Helvering"' the taxpayer owned all of the stock of a
corporation which held certain assets which the taxpayer wanted to sell
to a third party. The existing corporation transferred such assets to a new
corporation and caused the stock of the new corporation to be issued to
the taxpayer. Shortly thereafter, the new corporation dissolved, its assets
were distributed to the taxpayer, and the taxpayer sold the assets to a third
party. In holding that the net result of the steps was a dividend to the tax-
payer, the Supreme Court observed with respect to the new corporation
that:
No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was
nothing more than a contrivance to [disguise the true character of the trans-
action. ... It was brought into existence for no other purpose; it performed,
as it was intended from the beginning it should perform, no other function.
When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put to
death .... 274
Even though Gregory involved a corporate reorganization, the prin-
ciple should apply under section 351 to the extent that the transferee cor-
poration is formed only to perform a transitory function in a section 351
transaction designed solely to avoid tax. If, however, the transferee cor-
poration is a viable one and continues in existence after the section 351
transaction, the business purpose doctrine should not be used to attack the
transaction. Therefore, it appears that the Tax Court in West Coast
Marketing Corp. and the IRS in Revenue Ruling 55-36 properly applied
the business purpose doctrine. It further appears that rejection of the
principle in W. & K. Holding Corp. was correct, since sections 446 (b) and
482 are readily available to correct improper allocations of income, de-
ductions, and losses by use of section 351. Revenue Ruling 60-331, how-
ever, does not appear to be a proper case for application of the business
purpose doctrine, and such a factual situation could be as easily, and more
properly, attacked by application of section 482.
The most perplexing current problem for tax practitioners is the re-
quirement of Revenue Procedure 70-17 that a business purpose be stated
for a section 351 transaction in an advance ruling request. Does this mean
that if the sole purpose for operating in the corporate form in the future
is to reduce the proprietor's or partners' personal tax liabilities and to ob-
tain the benefits of corporate profit-sharing and pension plans, as is usual-
ly the case at least with professional corporations, such a purpose is not a
sufficient business purpose under section 351? Obviously, avoidance of the
individual rate structure and the use of tax-favored corporate employee
benefit plans can be classified as tax avoidance motives. However, it appears
that this is the very type of tax avoidance that section 3 51 was enacted to
implement by allowing simple transitions from a noncorporate to the
273 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
274 Id. at 469-70.
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corporate form of operation. Hopefully, the IRS will limit its application
of the business purpose doctrine under section 351, so that the sole function
of that doctrine will be to assure that the transferee corporation is a viable
entity.
It may be implicit that Congress intended that a normal section 351
transaction could be consummated to allow tax avoidance through opera-
tion in the corporate form, since Congress has explicitly required a busi-
ness purpose (other than tax avoidance) for certain aspects and types of
section 351 transactions. For example, whenever liabilities are assumed, sec-
tion 357(b) requires that a business purpose (other than tax avoidance)
for the assumption be present in order to avoid recognition of gain as the
result of such assumption."' Furthermore, when the transfer is to a foreign
corporation, it is required that a ruling be obtained reflecting that the
transaction was for a business purpose. If such a ruling is not obtained
under section 367, section 351 will not apply."' Such specific references
to business purpose for certain aspects and types of section 351 trans-
actions certainly raise an inference that the applicability of the business
purpose doctrine should be limited under section 351.
B. Continuity of Interest
The courts have developed a doctrine in the reorganization area which
requires that the transferor have a continuity of interest in the surviving
corporation. 7 ' No authority exists relating to the applicability of this
doctrine to section 3 51.
A question could be raised regarding continuity of interest, of course,
where one of the parties to the transaction receives nothing but securities
of the transferee corporation. However, since section 3 51 by its very terms
requires continuity of interest within a group of transferors, the continu-
ity-of-interest doctrine should not apply under section 351, even if one
or more transferors receives only securities. In cases where a transferor or
transferors already control a corporation and transfer additional property
to such corporation in exchange for its securities, the continuity-of-interest
doctrine might be applied to cause the transfer to be taxable. If section
3 51 can be avoided in this manner, it appears that the legislative purpose of
section 3 51 would be frustrated, since in such a case there has been noth-
ing more than a mere change in form of ownership.
XIV. ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
A. General
As a general rule, the transferee corporation is treated as a new tax-
payer for federal income tax purposes unless the transfer is made to a
pre-existing corporation. Section 381, relating to the carryover of certain
tax attributes in tax-free reorganizations and certain liquidations, does not
2'See text accompanying notes 205-19 supra.
276 See text accompanying notes 313-30 infra.
""
7 See LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940).
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apply to section 351 transactions." ' Therefore, a new corporation may
make new elections relating to accounting methods and period without
regard to the methods or period of the predecessor business.
B. Depreciation
The transfer corporation is not considered to be the original user of
depreciable assets which it receives in a section 351 transaction." 9 There-
fore, the corporation will not be entitled to use double declining or sum-
of-the-year-digits methods in computing depreciation for such assets.
Furthermore, additional first-year depreciation is not available, because
a section 351 transaction is not a "purchase" for purposes of section 179.2'0
C. Accounting Methods and Period
Since the transferee corporation is regarded as a new taxpayer, it may
elect any accounting method and period it chooses. The fact that the cor-
poration is a new taxpayer may be burdensome if the Commissioner re-
quires accounting adjustments in the first taxable year of a new corpo-
ration. In Ezo Products Co.2"' the predecessor partnership had not used
inventories in computing its taxable income and had reported its taxable
income using the cash method of accounting. After incorporation, the
Commissioner asserted that inventories were required in order to properly
reflect income, thereby necessitating a change to the accrual method of ac-
counting. In computing its taxable income for the first year, the corpo-
ration had no basis in its beginning inventory because of the carryover of
basis from its predecessor. No relief was available under section 481 be-
cause the new corporation did not have a "preceding taxable year" for
purposes of section 481(a). Therefore, the corporation was deprived of
benefits which might have been available to its predecessor under section
481.
The rule of Ezo Products also applies to other items which may be ad-
justed in the corporation's first taxable year. Accounts receivable received
from a cash-basis predecessor, of course, have a zero basis to the corporation
and are income when collected. If the Commissioner requires the cor-
poration to adopt the accrual method for its first year, section 481 does
not apply, and the corporation will have income both from collection of
the zero basis receivables and from accrual of its own receivables. 8 '
It appears that an exception may be developing if the new corporation is
a subchapter S corporation in its first taxable year. The Tax Court has
indicated that where subchapter S treatment is elected by the corporation,
section 481 may be available, since the adjustments affect the income of
the same taxpayers. " ' This judicially-sanctioned exception to the statute
.'.Cf. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 381(a)(1), (2).
279Rev. Rul. 67-286, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 101.
.. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 179(d) (1) (B), 179(d)(2)(C)(i); Treas. Reg. 5
1.179-3(c)(1)(iii) (1960).
28137 T.C. 385 (1961).2 S2 Id.211See Paul H. Travis, 47 T.C. 502 (1967), rev'd in part, aff'd in Part, 406 F.2d 987 (6th
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is extremely difficult to justify since a corporation, regardless of its sub-
chapter S status, is a separate taxpayer.
D. Installment Obligations
A transfer of installment obligations to a corporation under section 3 51
does not "trigger" the unrealized gain attributable to such receivables. 84
An exception to this rule might well occur where a taxpayer sells assets
to a corporation on the installment basis and subsequently exchanges his
installment note for additional stock of the corporation, thereby cancel-
ling the debt of the corporation. In this situation, the corporation would
receive a stepped-up basis for the assets as a result of its purchase of them
with an installment note, and the shareholder would never recognize the
gain on the installment sale. In Jack Ammann Photogrammetric Engineers,
Inc. v Commissioner"5 the Fifth Circuit indicated that a stockholder,
whose tax treatment was not in issue, might realize taxable income upon
the transfer of an installment obligation to the debtor corporation in a
section 351 transaction. It appears that an exception to the general rule
should apply when a creditor holding an installment obligation transfers
such obligation to the debtor in a section 3 51 transaction.
E. Reporting Requirements
The regulations under section 351 provide that each transferor must
file with his individual income tax return for the year in which a section
3 51 transaction occurs, a statement of all pertinent facts, including a de-
scription of property transferred, the stock and/or securities received, any
other property received, and any liability assumed by the controlled cor-
poration.'" The transferee corporation must include in its return for the
taxable year in which the exchange occurs a description of the property
received, including a statement of the basis of such property to the trans-
ferors, information with respect to the stock and securities of the corpo-
ration, the amount of money, if any, paid to each of the transferors, the
fair market value and basis of any other property paid to the transferors,
and certain information relating to the liabilities assumed by the corpora-
tion."8" The regulations further require that all parties to a section 351
transaction retain permanent records relating to their participation in
such transaction."
XV. AVOIDING SECTION 3 51
A. General
As indicated above, if a transaction qualifies under section 3 51 (a), the
transferor's basis in the transferred property carries over and becomes the
Cir. 1969); E. Morris Cox, 43 T.C. 448 (1965), not acquiesced in on this issue, 1965-2 Cum.
BULL. 7.
284 See note 247 supra.
2s 341 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1965).
2
"Treas. Reg. S 1.351-3(a) (1955).2
11 Id. S 1.351-3(b).
2 8 8 Id. § 1.351-3(c).
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transferee corporation's basis in such property. From time to time, trans-
ferors attempt to avoid section 351 by "selling" property, hopefully at
capital gain rates, to the transferee corporation in order to give the corpo-
ration a stepped-up basis which can be offset against subsequent ordinary
income of the corporation. " ' In many cases, this advantage has been par-
tially or wholly laid to rest by sections 617, 1239, 1245, 1250, 1251, and
1252, which require treatment of at least part of the gain as ordinary in-
come if certain types of property are sold.
The "sale" technique may still provide a valuable planning tool in a
situation where sellers hold investment land which is to be subdivided. If
the land can be sold to a corporation at capital gain rates, the corporation
receives a stepped-up basis to offset against the ordinary income to be de-
rived from subsequent sales of the subdivided land. The sale technique
may also be used to realize a loss on property which has depreciated in
value, if the problems created by section 267 (a) (1) can be avoided.
In addition to the sale technique, section 351 may be partially or com-
pletely avoided by (1) use of boot; (2) intentionally failing the control
test; and (3) transferring debts in excess of basis.
B. Sale Versus Section 351
Traditionally, a taxpayer, desiring that a portion of his property be sold
to a new corporation, will transfer part of his property to such corporation
for stock in an obvious section 351 transaction. The balance of the prop-
erty is then sold to the corporation, generally in exchange for long-term
notes.
The first test of a sale is whether the purported debt obligation is actual-
ly debt or is additional stock.'" Usually, the courts have reviewed the
capital structure of the corporation to determine if it is "thin." '' If it is,
the debt is held to be stock and the purported sale falls within section
351 (a).
In a recent case, Burr Oaks Corp., 2 real property valued at $165,000
was transferred by three individuals to a corporation controlled by their
nominees in exchange for short-term notes totaling $330,000. The cor-
poration had total equity of $4,500 at the time of transfer. The Tax Court
found the corporation undercapitalized, its future speculative, and its
debt-equity ratio unfavorable (approximately 80:1). As a result, the
court held that the short-term notes were in the nature of preferred stock,
thereby causing section 351 to apply to the purported sale. In an earlier
case, Aqualane Shores, Inc., " three individuals purchased the stock of a
corporation for $600 and immediately sold appreciated real estate to the
289See generally Ellis, Tax Problems in Sales to Controlled Corporations, 21 VAND. L. Rv.
196 (1968).290 See BITTKER & EUSTICE 121-27.
..t See generally Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 771 (1959).
29243 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007
(1967).
29330 T.C. 519 (1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
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corporation. The corporation was obligated to pay the purchase price in
five equal yearly installments. The Tax Court found that inadequate
capital, failure to pay the installments when due, and the necessity of ad-
ditional outside borrowing required that the debt be treated as stock and
that section 351 apply." Even if the corporation is not "thin," if the
property transferred does not produce income or does not produce suf-
ficient income to amortize the debt, the courts may view the debt as an
equity investment. 9' On the other hand, if the property has sufficient in-
come potential to pay the debt, this factor should not be considered.'"
Another significant factor may be the treatment of the debt obligations
by the parties. If payments are not timely and the debt is generally ig-
nored, such treatment may infer that the debt is actually equity.97 It is
hoped that the IRS will promulgate definitive regulations under section
385 (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969) and help resolve the debt-
equity mystery.
If the corporation passes muster on the debt-equity question, the court
must then determine whether the debt is a security for purposes of sec-
tion 3 51. In Camp Wolters Enterprises, Inc.9 ' property was conveyed to
a new corporation in exchange for notes payable over a five-year period
commencing in the sixth year after issuance. The notes were treated as the
issuance of boot by the corporation, thereby giving the corporation a
partially stepped-up basis. The Tax Court and Fifth Circuit treated the
notes as securities under section 351 and denied the stepped-up basis to
the corporation. In a recent case, George A. Nye,' the Tax Court held that
an installment note was debt, thus disposing of the debt-equity ques-
tion.0 0 The debt was, however, a security for purposes of section 3 51.30'
A variety of cases have found that a "sale" existed despite close simi-
larity to other cases where debt was found to be equity or a security. In
Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States" the Fifth Circuit found, regardless
of a high debt-equity ratio, that a sale occurred seemingly because of the
form of the transaction. The Sun Properties case was distinguished by the
Fifth Circuit in Aqualane Shores, Inc."3 on the theory that the property
in Sun Properties yielded sufficient income to amortize the debt, whereas
the property in Aqualane Shores did not. The Sun Properties case appears
to be of little precedential value due to overemphasis of form, rather than
substance.
"'See also Truck Terminals, Inc., 33 T.C. 876 (1960), aff'd, 314 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1963).
.. 'See Aqualane Shores, Inc., 30 T.C. 519 (1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
'"See Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
"' See, e.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408 (1954), afl'd, 236 F.2d
159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957). See also Marsan Realty Corp., 22 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1513 (1963).
29922 T.C. 737 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 826 (1956).
299 50 T.C. 203 (1968), acqniesced in, 1968-2 CUM. BuLL. xxv.
...See also United States v. Hertwig, 398 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1968).
"' See also Parkland Place Co. v. United States, 354 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1966); Campbell v.
Carter Foundation Prod. Co., 322 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1963); Baker Commodities, Inc., 48 T.C.
374 (1967).
32 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
30330 T.C. 519 (1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959).
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In a 1965 Tax Court case, Charles E. Curry,' four family members
sold an income-producing building to a corporation in which two of the
sellers owned fifty-five per cent of the stock and the balance was owned
by a son-in-law of one of the sellers. The sellers received two promissory
notes for the building, the first for a period of ten years, secured by a first
mortgage and payable in semi-annual installments, and the second, se-
cured by a second mortgage, providing interest only for ten years with
ten annual installments payable beginning in the eleventh year. Although
the incorporation and sale were found to be interdependent steps, and
despite the corporation's high, thirty-to-one debt-equity ratio, the Tax
Court held section 351 inapplicable because of the disproportion between
the ownership of the stock and the notes." The court, however, failed to
consider whether the notes were securities. Presumably, the twenty-year
note could have easily qualified as a security. The! ten-year installment
note should also have qualified as a security, despite the holding in the
Brown case' that installment notes do not maintain a sufficient con-
tinuity of interest. The Curry decision has led and will continue to lead to
irreconcilable court decisions. Therefore, similar transactions will lead to
different tax results. It is obvious that the courts must read section 351
literally and weld all parts of the incorporation transaction together so
that interrelated incorporations and sales will be treated as a single trans-
action, and long-term notes, if any, received in the purported sale will be
given the proper classification (whether as boot or securities) under sec-
tion 351.
An attempted sale which subsequently is held to be a section 351 trans-
action may prove very unfavorable to all parties. For example, if the
transferors treat the transaction as a sale, report the gain, and pay tax
thereon, and the IRS later sustains that the corporation does not have a
stepped-up basis because section 351 applied to the original transfer, the
appreciation may be taxed twice. This result could occur where the statute
of limitations had elapsed with respect to the transferor's years in which
the gain was taxed. The mitigation provisions found in sections 1311-1315
appear to provide no relief in this situation. Hence, the transferor would
be well-advised to defer receipt of note payments for several years until
the issue of the corporation's basis can be resolved.l 7
One caveat which taxpayers attempting to avoid section 351 by the
sale technique should carefully observe is that the sales price of the prop-
erty must be at fair market value. Otherwise, sales proceeds in excess of
the fair market value may well result in dividends in later years.
30443 T.C. 667 (1965), acquiesced in, 1965-2 CUM. BULL. 4, acquiescence on section 351
issue withdrawn, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 3.
" In an earlier case, the Tax Court disregarded disproportionate holdings within a single family.
See Zephyr Mills, Inc., 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 794 (1959).
ass See text accompanying notes 168, 169 supra.
07 See BrrTKER & EuSTICE 96 n.43, for a comprehensive discussion of the results of erroneous
treatment of basis by either the transferor or the transferee. See also Burford, Basis of Property
After Erroneous Treatment of a Prior Transaction, 12 TAx L. REv. 365 (1957).
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C. Use of Boot
A partially taxable transaction may be readily accomplished under
section 351 (b) by the use of boot. The disadvantages of this approach are:
(1) losses cannot be recognized; (2) the boot is allocated among all as-
sets transferred; and (3) installment reporting may not be available."8
If, therefore, the transferors desire to recognize a loss or have gain recog-
nized only with respect to certain assets, such as capital assets, the boot
technique may be unsatisfactory.
D. Avoidance of Control
As discussed above, the transferors as a group must be in control of the
transferee corporation immediately after the exchange. It appears clear
that if a legally binding contract requiring sale of more than twenty per
cent of the stock exists prior to the date of transfer under section 351,
control would not be achieved (assuming that the contract is not a sham).
Care should be taken not to convey an interest in the property to be
transferred to the contracting party prior to the section 351 transaction. If
such a transfer occurred, the third party might be deemed to be a trans-
feror.'
Another avenue of avoidance would be to have the transferee corpo-
ration issue more than twenty per cent of its stock for services or to issue
a separate class of nonvoting stock for such services. Any issuance of
stock for the announced purpose of avoiding section 351 would, of course,
be reviewed carefully by the Service. Avoidance of the control require-
ment would require recognition of the entire gain, which might not be
advantageous. In addition, only in some cases would installment reporting
be available.
E. Liabilities in Excess of Basis
Gain may be recognized by merely having liabilities in excess of the
basis in property transferred to the transferee corporation."s Such gain
presumably must be allocated among all assets on the basis of relative fair
market values, regardless of the character of the assets. Further, install-
ment reporting probably would not be available."l' It should be noted that
if the liabilities are specifically created to be assumed by the transferee
corporation, section 357(b) might well apply to cause all liabilities as-
sumed to be treated as boot, rather than just that portion in excess of
basis.a Hence, great care should be exercised in choosing this avenue.
30 See generally text accompanying notes 172-97 supra.
'0 Cf. Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948), in which the
taxpayer made such an argument, but the Fifth Circuit rejected it due to the absence of any evi-
dence of a transfer prior to the exchange with the corporation.
ai°See generally text accompanying notes 199-227 supra.
a The entire excess of debt over basis would be treated as "other property" received in the
year of sale for purposes of § 453.
515See text accompanying notes 206, 218, 219 supra.
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XVI. SECTION 3 51 AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
A. General
Section 367 provides, in part, that:
In determining the extent to which gain shall be recognized in the case [of
an exchange described in section 351], a foreign corporation shall not be
considered as a corporation unless, before such exchange, it has been estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the Secretary or his delegate that such exchange
is not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of Federal income taxes. 13
Presumably, tax avoidance by clever use of section 351 prompted en-
actment of the predecessor of section 367 in 1932.14 At that time, without
section 367, a United States corporation could form a subsidiary in a
foreign country imposing no tax on capital gains, transfer appreciated
securities to such foreign subsidiary under section 351, cause the foreign
subsidiary to sell the securities without incurring tax on the gain, have
the foreign subsidiary transfer the funds to a new United States subsidiary,
and then liquidate the foreign subsidiary. As a result, the United States
parent could avoid tax on the appreciation and indirectly repatriate the
funds.
Failure to obtain an advance ruling under section 367 will not result in
a benefit to the taxpayer. If a ruling is purposefully not requested in order
to achieve a taxable transaction, the IRS will ignore section 367 and treat
the transaction as nontaxable."' On the other hand, if a ruling is not ob-
tained in a transaction which the taxpayer desires to be tax-free, gain will
be recognized."1' Hence, section 367 is a one-way street, and the control
of the direction of traffic is solely in the hands of the Service. One excep-
tion to the requirement of a section 367 ruling is where a United States
taxpayer transfers only cash to a foreign corporation. In such a case, no
gain is recognized, even if the value of the stock received exceeds the
amount of cash paid."' As previously discussed, the IRS has attempted to
extend section 367 to cover contributions to capital by treating such trans-
actions as "constructive" section 351 transactions. This extension, in the
author's view, has been properly rejected by the Tax Court and the Second
Circuit.31
Section 367 applies only to gains. Losses are not recognized under sec-
tion 351 regardless of whether or not a section 367 ruling is obtained.
Further, losses may not be netted against gains. Hence, all gains are recog-
nized on an asset-by-asset basis if a favorable ruling is not obtained. 3 '
"'The effect of the language of 5 367 is to require the transferor to recognize gain on the
exchange. However, the transferee does not lose corporate status for such matters as earnings and
profits. See Rev. Rul. 64-158, '1964-1 CUM. BULL. 140.
314S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted at 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 515.
"'5 Rev. Rul. 64-177, 1964-1, Cum. BULL. 141.
3"See Texas-Canadian Oil Corp., 44 B.T.A. 913 (1941).
'
1 1 Rev. Rul. 68-43, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 146. See also Rev. Rul. 70-433, 1970 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 34, at 11.
' See text accompanying notes 143-48 supra.
"' Rev. Rul. 67-192, 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 140.
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B. Section 3 67 Guidelines
For a number of years the IRS failed to develop any definite guidelines
for section 367 rulings. Consequently, substantial confusion existed re-
garding such rulings. Finally, Revenue Procedure 68-23... was issued, and,
among other things, it provides some definite guidelines for section 351-367
rulings."'
C. Transfer by United States Person
to Foreign Corporation
Revenue Procedure 68-23 states that ordinarily a favorable ruling will
be granted where property is transferred to a foreign corporation and such
property will be used in the active conduct of a trade or business or con-
sists of stock or securities of the type described in sections 3.02 (1) (a) -
(iii) (A) and (B) of the procedure.3 2' In addition, it is contemplated by
the procedure that the foreign corporation will require a substantial in-
vestment in fixed assets for its trade or business, or will be engaged in the
purchase and sale abroad of manufactured goods."2 ' Presumably, the theory
of the procedure is that if substantial property is required to conduct an
active business, tax avoidance becomes a less likely motive for the trans-
action.
A favorable ruling will not be granted if the following types of assets
are transferred-"U
1. Inventory, other property held for sale to customers, a copy-
right, literary, musical, or artistic composition or similar property;
2. Accounts receivable or installment obligations, unless the income
attributable thereto is or will be included in the year's income of
the transferor for United States income tax purposes;
3. Most stocks or securities;
4. Other property, if it appears that the principal purpose of its
transfer is its sale or other disposition by the foreign corporation.
It is obvious that all these classes of property are objectionable to the
Service because of the diversion of income to foreign jurisdictions. With
the exception of stock or securities, rather immediate realization of
the income will result from sale or collection, and it is difficult to justify
transferring such liquid assets outside the jurisdiction of the United States
s20 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 821.
12" See generally Herskovitz, New Objective Tests Established by IRS for Favorable Section
367 Rulings, 29 J. TAXATION 158 (1968); Sitrick, Section 367 and Tax Avoidance: An Analysis
of the Section 367 Guidelines, 25 TAx L. REv. 429 (1970).
s2s Stock or securities which may be transferred are: (1) stock or securities of "less developed
country corporations" to a "controlled" corporation which is, or will be, and will continue to be,
a "less developed country corporation holding company" owning 10% or more of the voting power
in a "less developed country corporation"; or (2) stock of a foreign corporation which will be
80% "controlled" by the transferee foreign corporation, which must be more than 507 "con-
trolled" by the transferor, who was in control of the corporation whose stock is being transferred.
Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 823. Further technical requirements for the qualification
of such stock or securities are found in the Procedure.
a
23 Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 821, § 3.02(1).
324 Id. § 3.02(1)(a).
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income tax. Stock or securities are included, of course, due to the poten-
tial avoidance of United States tax on appreciation, if and when sold.
A favorable ruling generally will not be granted if the following types
of assets are transferred :"
1. Property which is presently leased or licensed (except that licensed
or leased to the transferee corporation), or which it is probable
will be licensed or leased after the transfer;
2. United States patents, trademarks, and similar intangibles to be
used in connection with (1) the conduct of a trade or business in
the United States, or (2) the manufacture in the United States or a
foreign country of goods for sale or consumption in the United
States;
3. Foreign patents, trademarks, and similar intangibles to be used
in connection with the sale of goods manufactured in the United
States.
Presumably, the reason for the objection to the items mentioned in cate-
gory (1) above is the taking of the rents or royalties outside the juris-
diction of the United States income tax. Obviously, there is usually no
valid purpose, other than tax avoidance, to justify the transfer of in-
tangible property included in category (2) to a foreign corporation where
such corporation will use such property to conduct a trade or business in
the United States. It appears that category (3) was included to prohibit a
United States person from transferring valuable foreign intangibles to a
related foreign corporation and thereby, by virtue of the regulations
under section 482, transfer a major portion of the income generated from
sales of the transferor's goods to such foreign corporation.
The procedure does provide with respect to all the prohibited trans-
fers described above that a favorable ruling will be issued if, in addition to
such property, other property which is to be devoted to the active con-
duct of a trade or business in any foreign country is being transferred,
and the transferor agrees to take into income an amount equal to the ap-
preciation in the tainted property being transferred. The gain is to have
the same character it would have had if such property were sold in a tax-
able transaction.'" The guidelines do not refer to the treatment of trans-
fers of know-how. Such items are discussed at some length above, and
they are governed for purposes of section 351-367 rulings by the rules set
forth in Revenue Ruling 64-56 and Revenue Procedure 69-19.' "
D. Transfer by Foreign Corporation
to Foreign Corporation
Revenue Procedure 68-23 provides that a favorable ruling will be is-
sued where property is transferred from one foreign corporation to an-
other foreign corporation in a section 3 51 transaction.' The only excep-
3 1id. S 3.02(1)(b).
3
26 Id. § 3.02(1)(d).
11 See text accompanying notes 69-74 supra.
m Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 821, § 3.02(2).
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tion is where part or all of the property to be transferred consists of stock
of a controlled foreign corporation. In such a case, it appears that a favor-
able ruling would be issued only if section 1248, relating to gain on sale of
controlled foreign corporations, cannot be avoided permanently as a result
of the transaction.""
E. Transfer by Foreign Person
to United States Corporation
The procedure does not discuss transfers by a foreign corporation to a
United States corporation, since no gain or loss would be recognized in
such a transaction under section 3 51 regardless of whether or not the trans-
feror is a corporation.'
XVII. TRANSFERS TO INVESTMENT COMPANIES
A. General
For several years, section 351 was used as a basis for formation of swap-
funds, whereby investors diversified their portfolio by exchanging ap-
preciated stock or securities for stock of a newly-formed investment com-
pany."' Private rulings were issued to the effect that such exchanges quali-
fied under section 351. In Revenue Procedure 62-32, however, the IRS
stated that it would no longer issue advance rulings under section 351
when there was a transfer of appreciated stock or securities to a newly-
organized investment company, and the transfer was made as a result of
solicitation by a professional broker or similar person."2 Such transactions
continued, notwithstanding the fact that a ruling could not be obtained.
As a result, the Service took certain steps to prevent such transactions and
Congress followed with strong (perhaps too strong) remedial legislation
by amending section 351 (a) and adding section 351 (d).3
B. The Statute and Regulations
Section 351 (a) was amended to provide that it applied to transfers
"to a corporation (including, in the case of transfers on or before June
30, 1967, an investment company)." As a result, transfers to an "in-
vestment company," which is not defined in the statute, will not qualify
if made after June 30, 1967. Section 351 (d) was added to define applica-
tion of the June 30, 1967 date in situations where a registration statement
had to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In such
situations, the transfer was deemed to have been made by that date only
if: (1) it was made on or before such date; (2) the registration
statement was filed at the Securities and Exchange Commission before
a2 Id. § 5.02.
3
°See Rev. Rul. 55-45, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 34.
... See generally Shechtman, Economic and Equity Implications of the Recent Legislation Con-
cerning Swap Funds, 45 TAXES $50 (1967).
332Rev. Proc. 62-32, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 527, 5 3.01 (14) (b).




January 1, 1967, and the aggregate issue price of the investment com-
pany's stock or securities issued in the transaction did not exceed the ag-
gregate amount specified in the registration statement as of December 31,
1966; and (3) the transfer includes only property deposited before May
1, 1967."'
The absence of a definition of investment company in the statute caused
substantial concern because of the potential far-reaching effect of the new
provision on section 351 transactions not intended to be covered. The regu-
lations, however, substantially limited the applicability of the statute.'
The regulations provide that in order to be an investment company, the
transferee corporation must be: (a) a regulated investment company;
(b) a real estate investment trust; or (c) a corporation more than eighty
per cent of whose assets (excluding cash and certain debt obligations)
consist of (i) readily marketable stocks or securities that are held for in-
vestment, or (ii) interests in regulated investment companies or real
estate investment trusts.' If one corporation owns fifty per cent or more
of the voting power or value of the stock of another corporation, such other
corporation will be deemed to be a subsidiary and its stock held by the
first corporation will be disregarded." 8 In place of such stock, the first
corporation will be deemed to own its ratable share of such subsidiary's
assets. In order to be readily marketable, stocks and securities must be
traded on a stock exchange or on the over-the-counter market.' Con-
vertible debentures, convertible preferred stock, warrants, and other
stock rights will be treated as readily marketable if the underlying stock
is readily marketable.
It should be noted that a transfer will be deemed to be a transfer to an
investment company only if it results in a diversification of the transferor's
interest.". Hence, although the statute might well apply to closely-held
corporations, it is necessary that two or more transferors contribute non-
identical property so that the interests of each are diversified. Therefore,
the incorporation of investments held by a single owner should not pre-
clude application of section 351.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
It is impossible, of course, for any article to deal effectively with all
possible variations which may occur in a section 351 transaction. Hopeful-
ly, however, a reader of this Article will conclude that a section 351 trans-
action is not "routine." Many of the problems which may be encountered
can readily be resolved by the tax practitioner through a careful study of
his particular facts within the framework of section 351. There are, how-
"=See Rev. Rul. 67-122, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 78.
8"Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(c) (1967).
337Id. § 1.351-1(c)(1)(ii).
33'Id. § 1.351-1 (c) (4).
33Id. § 1.351-1(c)(3).
34 0 Id. §§ 1.351-1(c)(1) (i), -(c) (5).
1970]
814 SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
ever, certain areas in which Congress and/or the IRS should take correc-
tive or clarifying action. These areas include:
1. The applicability of section 351 to contributions to capital.
2. The problem of allocation of income and expenses between the
predecessor entity and the transferee corporation.
3. The problem of whether specific identification can be used in de-
termining basis of stock or securities received in a section 351
transaction.
4. The problem of a section 351 transaction followed by a public
offering of stock.
5. The confusion as to the applicability of the business purpose doc-
trine to section 351 transactions.
6. The need for definitive regulations under section 385 in order to
distinguish debt from equity.
With clarification of the above major problems by Congress and the In-
ternal Revenue Service, tax practitioners would find section 351 to be
a more useful mechanism in their repertoire of tax planning tools.
